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I.

INTRODUCTION

Trials are about finding the truth. Truth-seeking is an essential
function of trials under the “dominant official account of the trial
and its proper purposes,” which scholars have referred to as, among
other things, the “Search for Truth” model, the “Rationalist Tradition,” the “Rectitude of Decision” model, and the “Received View of
1
the Trial.” By truth, I mean here truth about historical fact—what
happened, whether the defendant in a criminal case committed the
acts charged. While trials also resolve other, softer questions of
truth—normative, value-laden judgments about matters such as de2
grees of culpability, states of mind, and degrees of harm —at their
most fundamental level, trials are about resolving historical questions
3
about who did what.
But even on such questions of hard historical fact, truth will always be imperfect, and trials will always be imperfect mechanisms for
ascertaining truth. Scholars have noted that determinations about
past acts or events differ from determinations centered on moral or
normative questions, such as issues about states of mind or degrees of
1

D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial
and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2004). As others have observed, trials also serve other objectives, including dispute resolution, “justice,” and a host of other values, which sometimes conflict with the search for the
truth. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair
Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037–40 (1987) (noting that there are two different
models of the Bill of Rights: a “search for truth” model and a “fair play” model);
Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (“Ours is a ‘justice’ system, not a ‘truth’ system. Overall, it
seeks justice for the accused, even if it means that in the occasional case, a guilty man
may go free.”).
2
And such questions can be especially vexing, posing, among other things,
complicated questions of admissibility of expert testimony. See generally CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE (2007).
3
As Michael Risinger has commented, questions of pure historical fact, when
decided wrongly, are those that raise the most compelling cases of injustice: “Although I have some fairly strong views on what the limits of criminal responsibility
ought to be as to age, impaired intelligence, etc., I don’t regard disagreements with
juries on such issues as raising questions of injustice of the same magnitude as real
factual innocence.” Risinger, supra note 1, at 1298. Errors regarding “complex,
no-one-right-answer, normatively charged judgments” such as state-of-mind questions
or questions related to degrees of culpability are “just not of the same type or moral
magnitude as errors convicting the wrong person.” Id. at 1299.
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culpability, because the latter turn on narrative accounts that are less
4
susceptible to precise determination. But, while it is true that moral
or value assessments are especially incompatible with notions of objective truth, issues of hard historical fact also turn on narrative accounts that can elude accurate or objective assessment. Lawyers are
keenly aware that their ability to convince a jury of the “truth” of their
client’s account of what happened turns on their ability to present
the more compelling or credible narrative, the story that best ac5
commodates the evidence and the values of their audience. There
may be a ground Truth—a reality about what in fact happened—but
the best a trial can do is reconstruct a facsimile of that reality. Yet the
best-sounding story, the most compelling narrative, will not always be
the true story. If nothing else has established this yet, the more-than200 post-conviction DNA exonerations—cases in which scientific
analysis has shown that the triumphant narrative at trial was wrong—
demonstrate that error is real and inevitable, at least to some degree,
even on hard, binary assessments such as determinations of whether
6
the defendant committed the actus reus or not.
If errors are inevitable, we must decide in which direction we
want to skew the risk of error. Our criminal justice system ostensibly
has decided that most risk of error should be borne by the prosecution. Hence, we put the burden of proof on the government, and
impose the highest legal burden at that—proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. As a corollary, we instruct juries that the defendant is presumed innocent, and we profess that it is better that ten (or one
hundred) guilty go free than that one innocent be wrongly con7
victed. We load our trials up with procedural protections, comforting ourselves, as Justice O’Connor put it in 1993 (before most of the
DNA exonerations had emerged), that “[o]ur society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the
Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting the
8
innocent.”
4

As Christopher Slobogin has written, “although ascertaining objective truth
might be possible with respect to acts, narrative thinking dominates attempts to reconstruct mental state. Any description of mental state is closer to a story than a depiction of an observable event.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 44.
5
Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 343, 346–47 (1991).
6
See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/Blog-Mo
re.php. (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
7
See Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Laws’ Epistemology, 86
TEX. L. REV. 347, 358 (2007); George C. Thomas III, Bigotry, Jury Failures, and the Supreme Court’s Feeble Response, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 978 (2007).
8
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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But contrary to that conventional assessment, our criminal justice system in fact does not put all—or in some respects, even a significant part—of the risk of error on the government. Our procedures and rules—from investigation through trial, appeal, and postconviction review—do not always reflect a commitment to protecting
the innocent. As Michael Scott and I have written previously, cognitive biases, institutional pressures, and systemic choices (including
everything from police training to judicial rules of evidence and procedure) combine to enforce a type of tunnel vision, which makes it
very difficult for a wrongly accused, and ultimately wrongly convicted,
9
person to be vindicated. Add to that the unevenness of resources
available to the defense and the prosecution, and it becomes clear
that, in significant respects, the system is skewed toward putting substantial risk of error on the innocent individual, not the government.
Many of these skewing mechanisms begin before a case ever
reaches court. Therefore, while the articles in this issue focus on evidence law, to a large extent, by the time questions relating to admissibility of evidence arise, it is too late to protect the innocent; the real
skewing has already occurred at the investigation stages, casting the
outcome in stone before the trial begins. But of course rules of evidence and procedure still matter, for in some respects those rules
work in concert with pre-trial skewing to heighten, rather than diminish, the risk of wrongful conviction.
Presentation of expert testimony, and in particular evidence
from the forensic identification “sciences,” illustrates well this confluence of factors that can skew the process and undermine truth and
protection of the innocent. While Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti10
11
cals, Inc. and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael promise protection from
unreliable scientific or expert testimony, in practice they have offered
little protection to criminal defendants; numerous commentators
have noted that, under the Daubert regime, unreliable expert prosecution evidence is routinely admitted, often with little resistance,
while some types of quite reliable defense expert evidence are rou12
tinely excluded.

9

See Keith A. Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292.
10
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
12
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Peter J. Neufeld,
The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are
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There are many reasons for this imbalance. The barriers to adequate screening of forensic sciences include some that arise outside
the litigation process, including the nature of crime laboratories and
the historical foundations for the forensic sciences themselves. Others are inherent in the judicial process, including the incapacities of
lawyers (poorly funded and poorly organized defense lawyers in particular) to raise adequate challenges, the paucity of available experts
to assist the defense bar, and the limited ability of lawyers and judges
(and juries) to understand and evaluate the sciences. Litigation of
admissibility and related questions concerning forensic sciences in
each case, dependent as it is on the abilities and resources of individual attorneys, judges, and “experts,” is a highly inefficient means of
assessing “science,” one that is bound to get it wrong with some regularity.
Identifying these problems suggests a solution: less case-by-case,
single-judge assessment of complex forensic science and more reliance on expert panels of scientists to help assess the validity of forensic sciences, establish the necessary protocols for reliable forensic science work in individual disciplines, define the limits of such scientific
evidence, and recommend of cautionary instructions or guidelines
accompanying such scientific evidence.
This Article considers these issues in several parts. Part II outlines impediments to criminal defendants’ ability to develop and present evidence of innocence, including both non-scientific and scientific evidence, at all stages of the criminal justice process. Part III
focuses on the criminal justice system’s inability to assess and present
scientific evidence, and how that inability undermines the search for
the truth in criminal cases. Finally, Part IV suggests reforms that
might mitigate these problems, including the creation of a national
forensic science institute or advisory committees designed to assist
courts in accurately assessing forensic sciences, and in some cases
supplanting the adversary case-by-case process for addressing concerns about such sciences.
II. FAILURES TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT:
DISPARITIES THAT DISADVANTAGE THE ACCUSED
A system truly committed to protecting the innocent as its highest value, to searching for a version of “truth” that is least susceptible
to false positives, would look very different than the American crimi-

Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49
(2000).
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nal justice system. Despite all its procedural safeguards and professed
concern for protecting the wrongly accused, the system is loaded with
disparities at every stage of the process that put innocent defendants
13
at risk.
A. Disparities in the Ability to Develop Evidence
From the moment a criminal investigation begins, the accused is
disadvantaged by lack of access to crime scene evidence and investigative resources. By the time a suspect is accused or charged, the
crime scene has usually been fully processed by police and relevant
evidence has been taken into police custody. Criminal defendants
lack both access to the evidence and to police assistance in developing additional evidence. If the crime scene is to yield evidence of innocence, the defendant typically will have to rely on police and
prosecutors to find, collect, develop, and disclose that evidence.
Relying on police to manage and control the crime scene and
the crime scene evidence is necessary and appropriate. But it does
carry costs to the innocent defendant’s ability to prove innocence,
particularly because of the way the role of the police is conceptualized in our criminal justice system. Police are an arm of the prosecution; they typically work closely with prosecutors, who, while theoretically charged with responsibility to “do justice,” in practice often
develop a conviction psychology in which catching and convicting the
14
suspect is the highest value.
As Michael Scott and I have described previously, police and
prosecutors, as human beings, especially human beings in an adversary system, are susceptible to a type of tunnel vision that can obscure
15
the truth. Natural cognitive biases can lead police and prosecutors
to reach a conclusion about guilt prematurely, and then to filter all
13

Values other than truth are also served by our adjudicative process that conflict
with the goal of seeking the truth. Those values, expressed for example through
various exclusionary rules, include respect for “individual dignity, privacy, [and]
freedom from unreasonable state regulation.” Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials
More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 107 (1996). The presumption of innocence is
itself a value that some suggest impedes the goal of determining objective truth,
given that it ostensibly skews the risk of error in one direction. Id. But as I have
noted, unlike many of the other competing values served at trial, it is a value premised expressly on an understanding that truth cannot be determined flawlessly; it
does not so much serve values that compete with truth, but more reflects values
about who should bear the costs of our inability to obtain perfect truth.
14
George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–12
(1975); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 328; Stanely Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988).
15
Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307–31.
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subsequent information through the lens of that conclusion. Cognitive biases such as confirmation bias and hindsight bias, among many
16
others, can lead investigators with the best of intentions to err.
Confirmation bias refers to the natural human tendency to seek,
recall, and interpret facts that are consistent with a conclusion one
17
has already formed.
Confirmation bias means that police and
prosecutors—as human beings—are likely, once they have identified
a suspect or formed a theory of guilt, to seek confirming evidence
and not seek disconfirming evidence. Accordingly, any ambiguous
evidence is likely to be construed as incriminating, any incriminating
evidence is likely to be viewed with heightened significance, and any
inconsistent evidence is likely to be ignored or marginalized as insignificant or unreliable.
Likewise, hindsight bias—the “knew-it-all-along” effect—can
skew judgments in ways that put innocent defendants at risk. With
hindsight bias, investigators (or lawyer or judges or any human beings) are likely to take after-acquired information and project it back
in time, so that an outcome will appear more likely or inevitable in
18
hindsight than it really was. Hindsight bias can make it appear that
judgments about the guilt of a suspect, or the outcomes of an investigation or of a trial, were obvious and inevitable from the beginning,
so that alternative investigative paths, suspects, or trials, are difficult
to imagine. If an initial judgment about guilt or a suspect is wrong,
hindsight bias will obscure that fact and make it difficult to imagine
how any different investigation or trial could have produced a differ19
ent result.
Institutional pressures on police and prosecutors to catch and
convict the criminals add to the tunnel vision that can put innocent
20
suspects at risk. Unrealistic public and media expectations, especially in the wake of violent and sensationalized crimes, can and have
resulted in pressure on police investigators to solve (“clear”) as many
cases as possible so that the case clearance rates reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the public are not so low as to erode
21
public confidence in police. And public pressure on prosecutors to
convict may even be more acute than the pressure on police, because
the prosecutor’s role in society is generally viewed narrowly as being
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 307–23.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319–22.
Id. at 323–31.
Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 324.
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to convict offenders, while police perform a wider range of public
22
service duties.
Thus, the investigation and prosecution of cases in an adversary
system has inherent biases that can help catch and convict the guilty,
but also can produce flawed justice. And, as has become obvious in
the wake of the 200-plus DNA exonerations in the last two decades,
wrongly convicting the innocent also exacts a toll on public safety,
because each wrongful conviction of an innocent person also repre23
sents failure to convict the guilty.
While initial investigations must be handled by police, a system
that is truly interested in protecting the innocent and finding the
truth would not make police an arm of the prosecution. Instead, police might be made neutral inquisitors who work for the court or
both parties, and not just the prosecution. Police investigative files
and crime scene evidence would then be made fully available fully to
both parties, with appropriate safeguards to protect the safety of sensitive sources of information or the integrity of ongoing investigations. Some European countries do just that—they make the police
24
investigative file fully available to both sides.
Those European countries have an inquisitorial system, not an
adversary system like the American criminal justice system. To some
commentators, the inquisitorial system is the superior system for finding the truth, because the inquisitorial system places truth as its highest value, while the adversary system, by placing control of the facts
and the litigation in the hands of opposing parties (who may be more
motivated to hide or slant the truth than to find it), primarily values
25
dispute resolution.
While the United States is not going to adopt an inquisitorial system (and I’m not arguing that it should), police can be reconceptualized as neutral investigators in ways that draw on some of the proffered advantages of the inquisitorial system. As neutral investigators
who serve the court and the parties roughly equally, police could play
the role of neutral inquisitor during the investigative stages, leaving
22

Id. at 327.
In thirty-seven percent of the DNA exonerations, the same DNA that exonerated the defendant also identified the true perpetrator. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 119 (2008). In many of these cases, the true perpetrator went on to commit other crimes that might have been prevented had the system not focused on the wrong person.
24
Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1623–24 (2005); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at
390–91.
25
See Brown, supra note 24, at 1588; Strier, supra note 13, at 103–05, 107–08.
23
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the prosecution and defense to remain fully adversarial—but more
equally positioned—in their use of the evidence at trial. By removing
police as much as possible from the adversary process, and making
them responsible in some measure to both competing adversaries in
a case, some of the inherent cognitive biases might be muted to some
26
extent.
Absent that shift, criminal defendants are at a vast disadvantage
in their ability to investigate and develop evidence. For the most
part, the only way defendants can now gain access to crime scene evidence is through discovery, which means they must depend on the
prosecutor to identify and disclose such information as the prosecu27
tor believes the defense is entitled to have. But discovery is notoriously limited in criminal cases, especially when compared to the ex28
tensive and wide-open discovery available in civil cases. Ironically,
litigants fighting over money have far more access to the facts and
evidence than does an innocent person wrongly accused and facing
many years or life in prison, or even death.
Criminal defendants not only lack full access to the facts and
evidence developed by the State, they also have very limited ability to
develop evidence themselves. They have virtually no say in how or
what police investigate; unlike prosecutors, they generally cannot ask
police to look into alternative suspects or alternative sources of evi29
dence. And criminal defendants, who are largely poor, generally
lack the resources to undertake investigations on their own that are at
30
all comparable to the investigations undertaken by police. While

26

See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 355–96 (setting forth numerous recommended reforms for mitigating tunnel vision in the criminal justice system).
27
Discovery in criminal cases arises from the prosecutor’s duty to disclose Brady
material—evidence identified by the prosecutor as material and exculpatory. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). For a critique of the Brady doctrine, see
Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search
for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129–54 (Carol Steiker ed., 2005).
28
See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to
New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541; see also Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process
Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1151–52 (2005) (listing
some of the ways in which discovery in criminal cases is inadequate and “subordinate[s] the truth-seeking function to other interests”).
29
As Andrew Leipold has observed, “prosecutors have enormous [investigative]
authority: they have broad investigative jurisdiction, the assistance of professional law
enforcement, statutory sanctions to encourage witness cooperation, and the credibility of the sovereign to support their efforts.” Leipold, supra note 28, at 1127.
30
See Brown, supra note 24, at 1602 (arguing that “defense counsel have limited
ability to extend investigations and prepare rigorous confrontations of evidence” because legislatures have so limited their funding); Leipold, supra note 28, at 1127
(noting that criminal defendants are unable to gather evidence adequately because
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state resources give the prosecution a clear advantage in criminal
31
cases under any system, the “wealth effect” is particularly pronounced in an adversarial process that puts the responsibility for
32
generating evidence solely in the hands of the parties.
In one respect, some criminal defendants do have an advantage
over the police—they, unlike police and prosecutors, were present
and know what evidence there is and how to find it. But that, of
course, generally applies only to guilty defendants. Innocent defendants—that is, those who played no part in the crime—usually have
no unique access to case-specific information, and therefore are at
the greatest disadvantage of all. The only evidence they have special
access to is alibi evidence. But empirical evidence confirms what cas33
ual observers suspect, that alibi evidence is largely ineffectual. Frequently, people cannot recall with any specificity what they did or
where they were at some particular point in the past. Not only must
the defendant recall, but the alibi witnesses also must recall, even
though the date and event may have meant nothing special to them
at the time. Any attempts by the defendant to remind her alibi witnesses will be exposed on cross-examination and cast as improper attempts to fabricate an alibi. And alibi witnesses are usually the people with whom the accused tends to spend the most time: family,
lovers, and friends—the very people whose alibi testimony is viewed
34
most skeptically as biased and manufactured. Thus, the disparity reflected in the lack of access to crime scene evidence and knowledge
about that evidence is a feature of the criminal justice system that applies with unique force to innocent defendants.
Moreover, pretrial detention makes the task of investigating even
more onerous. Courts, legislatures, and commentators have all recognized that pretrial confinement makes investigation and defending
35
oneself more difficult. But decisions about pretrial release typically
“defense counsel are under funded, either because clients cannot afford high fees or
because the State dollars to fund criminal defense work are spread too thin.”).
31
Strier, supra note 13, at 144.
32
Brown, supra note 24, at 1604.
33
Elizabeth A. Olson & Gary L. Wells, What Makes a Good Alibi: A Proposed Taxonomy, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157, 158 (2004).
34
Empirical research confirms that alibi evidence is generally not effective if it is
provided by people close to the defendant, such as girlfriends or family members, as
is typical. Id.
35
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2000) (providing for the temporary release of a detained suspect “to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be
necessary for preparation of the person’s defense”); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 527–28 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that bail
“facilitates preparation of a defense and prevents incarceration of a possibly innocent
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are based upon values and interests entirely independent of the innocent defendant’s need to assist in the investigation and preparation of his defense. Bail decisions are made on assessments of the defendant’s risk of flight and risk to the public, not on considerations
about the impact of detention on “the accuracy of the eventual
36
trial.” As Andrew Leipold has observed:
The problem is that the ex ante decision of whether defendant will
appear at trial or commit other crimes bears no necessary relationship to the degree of assistance that the accused can provide
in preparing his case. Whether the defendant has ties to the
community, a job, significant assets, or a criminal history tells us
nothing about whether the suspect needs to help his lawyer with
witness location, interviews, or other evidence gathering. We
might, however, hypothesize that there is a positive correlation
between the falsity of the accusation and the suspect’s need to assist in the defense. It might be precisely when the wrong person
has been charged that factual development, alibis, and hard-to37
find evidence are the most vital to the case.

The risk of error is also skewed against the innocent defendant
in other ways related to the ability to develop facts and investigate.
Police investigators, for example, are free to lie or employ various
forms of deception in their investigations. Police routinely use de38
ception during interrogations of suspects, or in undercover operations or ruses designed to gain access to homes or the inner circles of
39
criminal enterprises. But criminal defense attorneys may not em-

person”); Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986); Leipold, supra
note 28, at 1130 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.2(c) (2d
ed. 1999) (“There is little reason to doubt the proposition that pretrial detention has
a significant adverse impact upon the ability of a defendant to vindicate himself at
trial.”).
36
Leipold, supra note 28, at 1130.
37
Id. Leipold also cites data indicating that the percentage of federal defendants
who are released pretrial has dropped from sixty-two percent in 1990, to forty-five
percent in 2002. Id. at 1131 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2002)).
38
See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1275 (2007); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 581 (1979); see also CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xii (Fred E.
Inbau et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (influential police training manual that teaches the
use of deception during interrogations); Leslie Griffy, Fake Lab Reports Were Common,
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 23, 2007 (describing common ruse employed by police in which
they show suspects fake DNA reports in an effort to induce a confession).
39
See, e.g., State v. Moss, 492 N.W.2d 627, 632–33 (Wis. 1992) (approving police
use of pizza delivery ruse to gain entry to a dwelling to execute a search warrant); see
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ploy private investigators to lie in the course of developing information—or at least they do so at some risk of peril under ethics codes—
even if the deception might develop truthful information.
Two separate provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct bar deceit by attorneys—and, by extension, by investigators
working under their supervision—but not by police, or even frequently (by custom) by investigators working under the direction of
prosecutors. Rule 4.1(a) provides: “In the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of a ma40
terial fact or law to a third person.” Rule 8.4(c) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
41
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Rules 8.4(a) and
5.3(c)(1) provide that an attorney may not order or counsel another
to do that which he or she could not do himself or herself. While
these rules would seem to apply equally to both prosecutors and defense lawyers, in practice, as noted below, prosecutors routinely supervise law enforcement investigations that involve deceit without any
42
Moreover, police can operate independently of
risk of sanction.
prosecutors and engage in extensive dissembling without violating
the rule, but defense investigators never work independently of de43
fense counsel, and therefore cannot escape the rule.
The disparity in practice is reflected in recent disciplinary proceedings against a defense attorney who used a carefully planned and
limited ruse to get a witness to turn over exculpatory evidence to a
defense investigator. The disciplinary referee wrote that the District

also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76
OR. L. REV. 775, 778–86 (1997).
40
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2004).
41
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).
42
Although a few prosecutors have been disciplined for some egregious types of
misconduct (such as impersonating a public defender, see, e.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d
1175 (Colo. 2002)), most of the disciplinary actions have been directed at private
lawyers. See Eileen Libby, When the Truth Can Wait, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 26.
43
Wisconsin has since modified its rules to permit all lawyers to supervise others
who use deceit in the course of an investigation, so long as the activity is not otherwise barred by law. See WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 20:4.1 (2007) (“Notwithstanding [the general rule against deceit], a lawyer may advise or supervise others with respect to lawful investigative activities.”). Oregon has amended its rules to permit a
lawyer to advise and supervise people who engage in deceit in the conduct of investigations of violations of civil law, criminal law, or constitutional rights if the lawyer “in
good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken
place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.” OR. CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 8.4(b) (2006). Alabama expressly permits only prosecutors
to supervise deceitful investigations. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2)(a)
(2008).
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Attorney, who had filed the disciplinary complaint, “admitted in his
testimony that ‘prosecutors frequently supervise a variety of undercover activities and sting operations carried out by non-lawyers who
use deception to collect evidence,’ including misrepresentations as to
identity and purpose. The Director of [the lawyer disciplinary board]
44
agreed, calling it ‘normal practice.’” Both the District Attorney and
the director of the disciplinary board also “admitted to finding the
45
conduct acceptable for prosecutors, but not for private attorneys.”
The referee noted that “[p]rosecutors are even praised for successful
investigations involving dissemblance, the record shows, even though
they are able to apply for ex parte warrants, and criminal defense at46
torneys are not.”
Likewise, police and prosecutors are free to offer inducements
to witnesses for their testimony, but criminal defendants are not.
Some of the most unreliable evidence presented at trials comes from
jailhouse informants or codefendants—people who themselves are in

44

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley, No. 07-AP-478-D (Wis. Feb. 1, 2008)
(Referee’s Report and Recommendation at 22–23). After carefully considering alternatives, and determining that the contents of a computer possessed by a juvenile
complainant likely contained exculpatory evidence that the witness would likely delete if the defense alerted the witness or police of their desire to analyze the computer, the lawyer arranged for an investigator to pose as a research company to offer
the witness a free new computer in exchange for his old computer. The witness
agreed to the exchange, and the witness’s computer did indeed contain exculpatory
evidence. Id. at 5–10.
45
Id. at 23.
46
Id. The Referee ultimately concluded that the defense lawyer had not engaged
in misconduct in this case because the deceit was not “material,” id. at 14, the rules
both as written and enforced were vague, id. at 25, the rules were only meant to prohibit such deceit as would render an attorney unfit to practice law, id. at 21, and the
defense lawyer’s Sixth Amendment duty to provide zealous representation trumped
any restrictions that might otherwise have prevented this particular ruse, given that
there appeared to be no alternative means for obtaining this evidence, and the
sought-after evidence was at the time the linchpin of the defense. Id. at 27. The matter is presently pending final decision in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. As the Referee wrote:
Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult decision, with concurrent and
conflicting obligations: should he zealously defend his client, fulfill his
constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel, and
risk breaking a vague ethical rule that, according to the record, had
never been enforced this way? Or should he knowingly fail to represent [his client] in the manner to which he was entitled and hand him
persuasive ground for appeal, an ethics complaint, and a malpractice
claim? The Sixth Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr.
Hurley. A man’s liberty was at stake. Mr. Hurley had to choose, and he
chose reasonably, in light of his obligations and the vagueness of the
Rules.
Id. at 29. Rarely would prosecutors be confronted with such a difficult choice.
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trouble with the law—who testify for the State in return for promised
47
or expected lenience or some other benefit in their own cases. Yet,
any attempt by a defendant to offer anything of value as an inducement for favorable testimony from a witness would be not only im48
permissible, but criminal.
Similarly, although police and prosecutors cannot force reluctant witnesses to talk with them, they can use the gravitas of their station and their position of authority to persuade witnesses to cooperate, either out of trust or fear of that authority. And they can grant
immunity to obtain testimony or use the law to sanction uncooperative witnesses who impede their investigations by hiding evidence or
49
providing untruthful information. Criminal defendants and their
investigators have neither advantage.
Finally, as developed more fully below, the criminal justice system skews the risk of error against the innocent defendant by giving
the prosecution far superior access to forensic science and expert
50
witnesses.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that forensic science
can be tainted by biasing influences when analysts identify too
strongly with law enforcement and are exposed to case investigative
information that goes beyond what they need to know to conduct
51
their analyses. Accordingly, many observers have cited the need to
47

See Garrett, supra note 23, at 86 (finding that, of the first 200 DNA exoneration
cases, 35 (18%) involved false testimony from an informant, jailhouse informant, or
a cooperating alleged co-perpetrator); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional
and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 660–63 (2004); see generally Ian
Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999); Clifford S.
Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse: The Role of Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 55 (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) [hereinafter WRONGLY CONVICTED].
48
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2000) (“Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony
under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a
trial . . . before any court . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not
more than two years, or both.”). In United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.
1998), a panel of the Tenth Circuit held that a prosecutor’s offer of benefits in return for cooperation and testimony from a witness would also be illegal under §
201(c)(2). The court quickly reheard the case en banc, however, and reversed the
panel, holding that the statute does not apply to the government’s traditional authority to offer inducements to witnesses as a law enforcement tool. United States v.
Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
49
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (making it a crime to give materially false statements to or conceal information from federal authorities); see also Leipold, supra
note 28, at 1127.
50
See infra Part III.
51
See generally D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (2002); see also Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert
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make crime laboratories independent of law enforcement. Nonetheless, most crime laboratories are set up as an arm of law enforcement,
either as a unit within a police department or within a State Department of Justice. This arrangement, which increases the likelihood of
examiner error and hence can undermine the search for the truth,
also makes the forensic sciences largely inaccessible to criminal defendants. Unlike the government, if the defendant wants forensic
testing, she faces two obstacles: (1) she generally must seek prosecutor permission or court authorization to gain access to the evidence
for testing; and (2) she must find a laboratory and the resources to
conduct the testing, or in some circumstances get a court order for
52
testing in government laboratories.
In sum, far from skewing the risk of error to guard against convicting the innocent, the investigative, evidence-collection, and analysis stages of the process give almost all advantage to the prosecution.
If the presumption of innocence truly puts the risk of error on the
government rather than the accused, that presumption will have to
be effectuated in ways that compensate for the defendant’s inherent
disadvantage in the initial stages of a criminal case.

the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 422–23 (2004) (recommending independent crime labs); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 470
(1997) (recommending independent crime labs).
The point is made dramatically by a recent study in which five experienced fingerprint examiners who had previously analyzed fingerprints in a case and had all
concluded that the latent prints matched a suspect’s prints, were presented with the
same prints five years later, but were told that other evidence had excluded the suspect. Unaware that they had previously called the prints a match, this time four out
of the five examiners (eighty percent) either declared that the prints did not match
(three of the four) or that the prints provided insufficient information to permit a
definite decision (one examiner). Only one of the five examiners adhered to the
original conclusion, calling the prints a match. Expectation effects caused by the insertion of non-domain-specific information altered the conclusions of these examiners. Itiel Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74–78 (2006). The researchers
conducted a subsequent study in which six examiners were provided eight sets of
prints and were given subtle, routine, day-to-day contextually biasing information after having initially drawn conclusions without the biasing information. Two-thirds of
the examiners who received biasing contextual information made decisions inconsistent with their initial conclusions on at least one set of prints. Itiel E. Droer & David
Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 610 (2006); see
also Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need for Procedural
Changes, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407 (1984); Larry S Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987).
52
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 165.77(2)(a)1.b (2007) (authorizing the State Crime
Laboratories to perform DNA analyses for criminal defense counsel, but only if ordered by a court).
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B. Doctrinal Disparities that Put Innocents at Risk
Certainly the presumption of innocence and the demand for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt together create a significant advantage for the criminal defendant, helping to shift the risk of error to
53
the government. But are they and other trial protections enough,
especially given the huge disadvantages that criminal defendants, particularly innocent defendants, have in investigating and gathering
evidence? As has been observed many times, there is good reason to
believe that jurors actually approach cases with a presumption of
guilt, not a presumption of innocence, or at least in very fragile equipoise on the question of guilt or innocence, which is easily pushed to
54
a presumption of guilt as soon as the first evidence is heard. And
others have noted that the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has become diluted over time, and that it too is inade55
quate, at least alone, to protect the innocent. To evaluate the efficacy of the system’s ability to protect the innocent, some accounting
of other trial rules, particularly the rules of evidence, must be made.
If truth in the aggregate were the only or primary goal of the
criminal justice system, then evidence might either be admitted
evenly for both sides, without any or much screening by the courts, or
it might be screened for reliability in ways that are equally applicable
to both parties. But the American criminal justice system does neither.
Some scholars have argued that virtually all rules that exclude
56
evidence inevitably jeopardize the search for the truth. If evidence
53

Indeed, some commentators suggest that, because of protections like the reasonable doubt standard and the double jeopardy bar, the criminal justice system is
marked by “‘pro-defendant’ procedural protections.” Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
61, 62 (2007). While such rules are indeed “pro-defendant,” my thesis is that such
rules permit us to tell ourselves that we put all risk of error on the State, when on
balance our system actually skews the risk of error largely against the accused.
54
Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 340–41; Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger,
Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (citing Thomas M. Ostrom et al., An Integration Theory
Analysis of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
436 (1978)).
55
See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1165, 1170 (2003); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105–06 (1999).
56
See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 490 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1827) (“Evidence is the basis of justice: to exclude evidence is to exclude justice.”); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15,
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is logically relevant to a material issue, they contend, keeping the evidence from the jury out of concern that the jury will misuse it in
some way not only betrays distrust of the jury, but also unavoidably
57
reduces the jury’s ability to find the whole truth. But admitting evidence without restriction upon either party ignores the other disparities in the system, the effects of tunnel vision, and the fact that under
our system wrongful conviction of the innocent is not an “evil” equal
to acquitting a guilty person.
If we accepted fully that our constitutional justice system prefers
one particular version of truth, one invested as a highest value in protecting the innocent, then no relevant evidence offered by the defense would ever be excluded because exclusion of any relevant exculpatory evidence will always increase the risk of wrongly convicting
the innocent. Indeed, Katherine Goldwasser has argued that, because a criminal defendant has unique constitutional rights, exclusion of any relevant evidence offered by a defendant based on reli58
Excluding such relevant evidence
ability concerns is improper.
because of concerns about its reliability, she argues, is incompatible
59
with the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, and
even more so with the right not to be convicted except upon proof
60
beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to trial by jury. Similarly,
although somewhat more modestly, Janet Hoeffel has argued that,
under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, relevant
evidence offered by a criminal defendant is not properly excluded
based on any reliability concerns “unless it is ‘always so untrustworthy
and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility [i.e.,
“cross-examination, presentation of witnesses, closing arguments, jury

22 (2003) (noting that “pure adversaryists . . . would say that truth best emerges in
the clash of self-interested parties packaging whatever relevant information is available in the most persuasive way they can . . . and that, essentially the system would
work best if there were no rules of evidence beyond a weak relevance check”); Strier,
supra note 13, at 109 (arguing that most rules that exclude relevant evidence should
be abolished or minimized because they all impede the search for the truth).
57
Strier, supra note 13, at 109.
58
Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621 (1998); see also Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE
803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 975 (2008).
59
Goldwasser, supra note 58, at 622.
60
Id. at 623.
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61

instructions . . . ,” ] that it should disable a defendant from present62
ing her version of the events for which she is on trial.’”
If accepted, these principles would reflect a commitment to pro63
tecting the innocent as an institutional value of the highest order.
Excluding defense and prosecution evidence on the same footing out
of doubts about the reliability of the evidence might, on balance, increase the chances of getting the truth in the greatest number of
cases in aggregate. But because some of that defense evidence, excluded as unreliable, might in fact have been entirely accurate in
some unknown percentage of cases, excluding such evidence as a
category will mean that some innocent people will be convicted who
64
might not have been if their evidence had been heard by the jury.
61

Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1289.
Id. at 1352 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). Hoeffel argues
that “the purpose of the [Compulsory Process] Clause was to allow for the introduction of evidence by the accused through the adversarial process[,]” and that “[t]he
Clause aids in the search for truth across all cases by giving the defendant a procedure that allows his side of the case, and not just the prosecution’s, to be heard by
the jury.” Id. at 1277.
63
Different rules of admissibility for defense-proffered and prosecution-proffered
evidence would of course create stark asymmetries in the way evidence law is applied
in criminal cases. But the constitutional values at work here expressly endorse asymmetry. As one court has put it:
A criminal prosecution, unlike a civil trial, is in no sense a symmetrical
proceeding. The prosecution assumes substantial affirmative obligations and accepts numerous restrictions, neither of which are imposed
on the defendant. . . . The system of criminal law administration involves not only this procedural imbalance in favor of the defendant,
but also important aspects of the Government’s law enforcement power
that are not available to the defendant. . . . But in the context of a
criminal investigation and criminal trials . . . equalization is not a sound
principle . . . .
United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774–75 (2d. Cir. 1980). Hoeffel explains:
While the one-sided application of a favorable constitutional standard
may appear unfair, it is not. In a criminal case, the parties are assumed
to be on an unequal footing. The bundle of rights in the Sixth
Amendment—the right to notice, counsel, confrontation and compulsory process—were intended to offset the inherent imbalance between
the relatively powerful State and the powerless, resourceless defendant.
The parties are also on an unequal footing, however, because the defendant’s very liberty is at stake. The criminal justice system as designed to reflect the most undesirable verdict as that of the conviction
of the innocent.
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1360–61.
64
Randolph Jonakait has thus argued that the Sixth Amendment is intended to
protect the ability of individual defendants to stand up to the power of the State,
even if it comes at some cost to ascertaining the truth in the aggregate:
The rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process
constitutionalize the adversary system, and while we presume truth
comes out of this system, the converging [S]ixth [A]mendment protec62
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In any event, our system accepts that some judicial gate-keeping
is appropriate to filter out evidence for a variety of reasons, including
65
concern about reliability. As Goldwasser has put it, “[o]ne supposedly good reason for excluding relevant evidence—recognized in all
jurisdictions—is that the evidence, although logically probative of
66
something that matters in the lawsuit, is not sufficiently reliable.”
Rules reflecting this gatekeeping function premised on reliability
67
68
concerns include the “best evidence” rule, the rule against hearsay,
69
and rules limiting the admissibility of scientific evidence. Another
related reason for excluding relevant evidence, also reflected in the
rules of evidence in all jurisdictions, is the concern that some evidence, even if relevant and reliable, might be unfairly prejudicial—
and hence might be used in a way that renders the factfinder’s con70
clusions unreliable.
At the very least, because “truthfinding is not the only value at
stake” in criminal trials, additional values reflected in the defendant’s
right to present a defense, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
to trial by jury, argue for restraint when excluding defense evidence
tions guarantee neither accurate determinations nor even the most reliable way to ascertain the fact. Instead, the accused is guaranteed an
adversary criminal trial even if that is not the best truth-determining
process for him . . . . [T]he accused cannot be denied an adversary
criminal trial even if an inquisitorial proceeding would have determined the truth better in the accused’s case.
Randolph Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 557, 585 (1988) (footnote omitted); see Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 754.
65
In a related way, Mark Denbeaux and Michael Risinger have observed:
[N]o one argues in favor of a pure adversary system for the simple reason that such a pure system, like direct democracy, could not function
except under exceedingly rare conditions. This is because a pure adversary system would have no judge, in the sense we are accustomed to.
The parties would be free to present whatever they themselves determined to be helpful to their cause, and the party with the weakest case
could filibuster indefinitely . . . .
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56 at 21.
66
Goldwasser, supra, note 58, at 622. Goldwasser elaborates: “Viewed solely from
an evidence law perspective, excluding unreliable evidence makes a good deal of
sense. After all, the chief function of evidence law (at least by most accounts) is to
maximize the probability that the trier of fact will arrive at an accurate determination
of historical truth.” Id. at 632.
67
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1002.
68
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802; Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, Does Evidence Law Matter in
Criminal Suppression Hearings?, 25 LOY. L. REV. 987, 999 (1992) (“[H]earsay is excluded at trial precisely because it is unreliable.”).
69
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
70
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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71

based upon reliability considerations. Viewed without the gloss of
these constitutional values, the goal of minimizing the risk of an incorrect outcome “means minimizing the risk of either of two possibilities: the conviction of an innocent person, or the acquittal of a
72
guilty one.” But because the Constitution—and in particular the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—puts a much
higher value on preventing conviction of the innocent than on preventing acquittal of the guilty, these two possible “incorrect” out73
comes are not equally unacceptable. As Janet Hoeffel has put it,
“constitutional law has recognized that the primary function of a
criminal trial may not be truth-seeking, but the accused’s right to a
74
Hence, Goldwasser argues, these constitujust and fair verdict.”
tional values “simply cannot be squared with allowing courts to ex75
clude a criminal defendant’s evidence because of unreliability.”
1.

Rules that Purport to Protect Innocents

Some doctrines recognize the risk to the innocent posed by rules
that exclude defense evidence. The constitutional right to present a
defense, implicit in the right to compulsory process, for example, in
theory recognizes the defendant’s special constitutional claim to
voice at trial. But the Supreme Court’s right-to-present-a-defense
cases are confused and contradictory, and have been interpreted to
permit considerable restraint on a defendant’s ability to present evi76
dence. And the Compulsory Process Clause is largely ignored in
77
criminal jurisprudence.

71

Goldwasser, supra, note 58, at 632–42.
Id. at 633.
73
Id.
74
Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41, 73 (2001).
75
Goldwasser, supra note 58, at 632. Excluding relevant but unreliable defense
evidence might reduce the chances of a wrong acquittal. But it does so only by also
producing an occasional wrong conviction. Goldwasser argues: “Producing fewer
wrong acquittals at the cost of also producing a few additional wrong convictions is
not [consistent with reasonable doubt values].” Id. at 635.
76
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987),
and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), the Supreme Court described the
right to present a defense broadly, suggesting that the defense must be permitted to
introduce any evidence as long as “the evidence can be adequately measured by the
jury through the usual machinery of the adversary system—cross-examination, presentation of witnesses, closing arguments, jury instructions . . . .” Hoeffel, supra note
1, at 1289. In other cases, however, the Court has appeared to narrow the constitutional right, permitting evidentiary rules to limit defense evidence if those rules have
a rational basis, including a concern for reliability of the evidence. See, e.g., Scheffer
v. United States, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). For a thorough analysis of this dichotomy in
72
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Other doctrines recognize the defendant’s special claim to a
right to present evidence in more subtle (and even less universally
accepted) ways. For example, a few courts permit more leeway for
defense use of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” than for
78
prosecution use of such evidence.
Such “other acts” evidence is
generally inadmissible to prove character, that is, to prove that a per79
son had a propensity to commit the act at issue. When other acts
evidence is offered for a permissible purpose apart from proving
character or propensity, it is still subject to exclusion unless a court is
satisfied that its prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh its
80
probative value. Because it is generally the government that seeks
to introduce other acts evidence—usually to show that a defendant’s
81
prior conduct helps to prove guilt on pending charges —the rule
against propensity evidence is most often raised in defense efforts to
exclude evidence offered by the government. When invoked to prohibit the defense from introducing other acts evidence (so-called “reverse 404(b)” evidence)—usually evidence of an alternative suspect’s
82
prior conduct —some courts recognize that there is less danger of
unfair prejudice than when the prosecution uses other acts evidence
against the defendant himself. A defendant can be prejudiced directly by evidence that he committed other or similar crimes in the
past, or evidence suggesting that he is a bad person. But some courts
have noted that because the third-party suspect is not on trial, there is
less concern that the other acts evidence will be prejudicial in that

the Supreme Court’s right-to-present-a-defense cases, see Hoeffel, supra note 1, at
1288–1306, and SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54–55.
77
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1276 (The Supreme Court has read the Compulsory
Process Clause “to stand for nothing less than the accused’s ‘right to present a defense.’ . . . Yet, for reasons that are not entirely clear, litigants, courts, and scholars
barely give it a nod.”) (citations omitted).
78
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
79
See id.
80
FED. R. EVID. 403.
81
Other acts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove facts other than
propensity or character, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” or other similar matters.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Increasingly, courts liberally invoke those exceptions to admit
other acts evidence, coming very near to allowing the exceptions to swallow the rule.
82
Numerous authorities recognize that a defendant may use similar other-crimes
evidence defensively if it reasonably tends to negate his guilt of the charged crime.
See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 166–67 (5th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth
v. Murphy, 185 N.E. 486, 488 (Mass. 1933); State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn.
1949); State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Wis. 1999); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
304, 341 (3d ed. 1940).
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sense. These courts, accordingly, apply a less rigorous relevancy re83
quirement or prejudice analysis.
Other rules or doctrines also reflect special concern for the
status and constitutional rights of criminal defendants in other ways.
Those doctrines include the defendant’s right to confront her accus84
ers, her right to silence, rules that protect the confidentiality and
privilege of the defendant’s communications with counsel, and non85
reciprocal rules requiring disclosure of evidence under the Brady
doctrine. This last asymmetry, under which the government is required to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense, but
the defendant has no corresponding constitutional duty to disclose
inculpatory evidence to the prosecution, is moderated to some degree by reciprocal discovery statutes that most jurisdictions have
adopted. Under such statutes, a defendant’s right to obtain some
types of prosecution evidence (frequently scientific evidence) is con83

See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404–05 (3d Cir. 1991); State
v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1978). In Garfole, the court held:
We are of the view, however, that a lower standard of degree of similarity of offenses may justly be required of a defendant using othercrimes evidence defensively than is exacted from the State when such
evidence is used incriminatorily. As indicated above, other-crimes evidence submitted by the prosecution has the distinct capacity of prejudicing the accused. Even instructions by the trial judge may not satisfactorily insulate the defendant from the hazard of the jury using such
evidence improperly to find him guilty of the offense charged merely
because they believe he has committed a similar offense before.
Therefore a fairly rigid standard of similarity may be required of the
State if its effort is to establish the existence of a common offender by
the mere similarity of the offenses. [State v. Sempsey, 141 N.J. Super.
317, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.).] But when the defendant is offering that kind of proof exculpatorily, prejudice to the defendant is no
longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility, since ordinarily, and subject to
rules of competency, an accused is entitled to advance in his defense
any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress
his innocence of the charge made. [See N.J. R. EVID. 1(2).] The application of a modified requirement of relevancy to the proffer by a defendant is additionally justified by the consideration that the defendant
need only engender reasonable doubt of his guilt whereas the State
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 591 (footnote omitted). But see State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 671 (Wis.
1999) (rejecting the relaxed Garfole test, but still holding “that the standards of relevancy are stricter when the state seeks to introduce other crimes evidence to prove
identity because ‘the prejudice [resulting from such evidence] is apt to be relatively
greater than the probative value.’”) (quoting Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564
(Wis. 1967) (alteration in original)).
84
The Confrontation Clause, of course, has received considerable new force in
light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004).
85
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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tingent on the defendant’s obligation to provide similar evidence to
86
the prosecution.
Special rules also exist, in theory, for protecting criminal defendants against other types of potentially unreliable evidence. The Supreme Court has long recognized that eyewitness identifications can
87
be hopelessly unreliable. Indeed, the DNA exonerations confirm
that mistaken eyewitness identification is by far the leading cause of
wrongful convictions of the innocent, accounting for or present in
88
nearly eighty percent of all such convictions. The Court has struggled with developing a doctrine that can protect against convictions
based upon mistaken identifications. In its first attempts to solve the
89
90
problem in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the Court
declared that defendants have a right to counsel at a live-person
lineup. But that remedy offered little protection, because most identifications are made from photo arrays, not live-person lineups, and
the Court subsequently was not willing to impose a right to counsel at
91
photo viewings. Moreover, many if not most identifications occur
prior to formal charging, and hence prior to the point when the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, so even most live lineups
could still be conducted without the presence of counsel. Because
the right to counsel could not alone solve the problem of mistaken
eyewitness identification testimony, the Court ultimately turned to
the Due Process Clause to find a right to exclude eyewitness evidence
92
because of its unreliability.
Initially, it appeared that the Court’s Due Process analysis was
going to approach the problem of eyewitness error as a process question rather than a reliability question. On the same day that it de86

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
The Supreme Court first took on this issue in a serious way with a trilogy of
cases decided in 1967. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
88
See Garrett, supra note 23, at 60 (of the first 200 postconviction DNA exoneration cases, seventy-nine percent involved eyewitness error).
89
Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
90
Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263.
91
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). Of the first 200 postconviction
DNA exoneration cases, seventy-nine percent included eyewitness identifications that
the DNA proved to be wrong. Garrett, supra note 23, at 60. Although we now know
those identifications were mistaken, only forty-five percent of those wrongly identified individuals even attempted to challenge the admissibility of the eyewitness evidence, and, of these, only four appellants brought claims alleging a violation of the
right to counsel under Wade. Id. at 77–80. None of the challenges were successful.
Id.
92
See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
87
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cided Wade and Gilbert—process cases relating to the right to counsel
at identification procedures—the Court also held in Stovall v. Denno
that police conduct might so seriously taint an identification that ad93
mission of the identification would violate due process. The Court
held that admissibility of eyewitness testimony turned on whether police obtained the identification through procedures that were “so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [they violated the defendant’s right to] due process of
94
law.” In other words, it appeared that the Court’s focus would be
on whether the police had acted improperly—that is, whether police
had employed unnecessarily suggestive procedures. While the Court
focused its analysis on police conduct that might produce an unreliable identification, it did not purport to assess directly the reliability
95
of the identification itself.
Subsequently, however, the Court expressly adopted a reliability96
centered analysis. Beginning with Simmons v. United States, and then
97
98
developed more fully in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite,
the Court shifted its analysis in several ways. First, instead of evaluating whether police employed an “unnecessarily” suggestive identification procedure—a standard that inherently involves assessing
whether police had other, less suggestive alternatives available—the
Court said the test turns on whether police employed “impermissibly”
suggestive procedures—a vaguer formulation that permits more
99
flexibility for admitting dubious identification procedures. Second,
the Court held that, even if police utilized impermissible suggestiveness, the identification might nonetheless be admissible if, under the
totality of the circumstances, a court is satisfied that the identification
100
In other words, even bad procedures—
is sufficiently reliable.
highly suggestive police conduct—will be excused, so long as a court

93

The Court’s newfound right to counsel under Wade and Gilbert did not resolve
the issue presented in Stovall because the Court concluded that the Wade right to
counsel would not be applied retroactively. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296–301
(1967).
94
Id. at 302.
95
See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with
Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 264 (1991)
(noting that, in Stovall, “the Court did not consider whether the eyewitness’s pretrial
or in-court identifications were reliable”).
96
390 U.S. 377 (1968).
97
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
98
432 U.S. 98 (1977).
99
See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197; Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
100
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197.
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is satisfied that the resulting identification was reliable. The Court
expressly held that reliability, not process, is what matters.
Unfortunately, the reliability test the Supreme Court created is
101
deeply flawed and ineffectual.
The Court instructed that, in evaluating reliability, lower courts should assess five factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s
prior description of the criminal; (4) the witness’s level of certainty;
102
and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. But research has demonstrated that some of these factors—particularly cer103
tainty or confidence—are not significantly correlated to reliability.
And most of these factors are subjective assessments reported by the
witness herself. As such, any suggestiveness in the process infects not
only the identification, but also the witness’s assessment of the very
factors the courts consider to determine whether an identification is
reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness. The inherent circularity of the test dooms it to failure. The suggestiveness of the process
leads most witnesses to be highly confident, to say they had a good
opportunity to view, to say they paid attention to the criminal, and
even to incorporate police-suggested aspects of the suspect’s appearance into their descriptions of the perpetrators. Thus, while the Supreme Court ostensibly employs a reliability analysis to protect innocent defendants, the test in practice offers little protection. Indeed,
of the first 200 DNA exoneration cases, not a single one of these
wrongful convictions was reversed on appeal based upon a challenge
to eyewitness testimony under the Biggers and Brathwaite test, even
though eyewitness evidence was presented in seventy-nine percent of
the cases, and even though with the benefit of postconviction DNA
testing, it is now known that every one of those identifications was
104
wrong.

101
See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 122 (2006); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Evidence, Systemic
Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 620–22.
102
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
103
Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 14, 14–21 (1998); Gary L. Wells & A.L.
Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports
of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360–76 (1998); Gary L.
Wells et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness
Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112–20 (2002).
104
Garrett, supra note 23, at 60. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Biggers/Brathwaite standard, a number of state courts are abandoning that test. See, e.g.,
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Despite these specific areas in which courts have sometimes embraced, at least in theory if not in effect, some asymmetries necessary
to give heightened protection to the innocent, other doctrines and
practices pervert that hierarchy of values. For example, while Supreme Court doctrine establishes that reliability is the touchstone of
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, the Court eschews
reliability considerations when it comes to confession evidence. For
centuries, under both the common law and constitutional doctrine,
reliability was an important consideration for courts when assessing
105
106
the admissibility of an alleged confession. In Colorado v. Connelly,
however, the Supreme Court changed course and declared that under the due process voluntariness test, reliability is irrelevant. In
Connelly, a man suffering from psychotic delusions, in which God told
him to confess to a murder or commit suicide, approached a police
officer and confessed to a murder. Although the statement appeared
quite unreliable—indeed, police were unable to corroborate that the
defendant’s murder confession referenced any actual murder—the
Supreme Court held that, absent improper police coercion, the
statement was not inadmissible under the Due Process Clause. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: “A statement rendered
by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite
unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws
of the forum, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
107
Amendment.”
Thus, despite the Court’s declaration in the eyewitness identification cases that due process is primarily concerned with reliability,
and not with police conduct, in Connelly the Court held that, with reState v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d
1257 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981).
105
See Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV.
623, 624 (2007); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 489. Indeed, prior
to the 1940s, reliability was all that really mattered.
The first rules governing the admissibility of confessions were laid
down in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a time when illegal
police methods were relevant only insofar as they affected the trustworthiness of the evidence. Whatever the meaning of the elusive terms
“involuntary” and “coerced” confessions since 1940, for centuries the
rule that a confession was admissible so long as it was “voluntary” was
more or less an alternative statement of the rule that a confession was
admissible so long as it was free of influence which made it untrustworthy or “probably untrue.”
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 226 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
106
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
107
Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
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gard to confessions, reliability is irrelevant and all that matters is police conduct.
2.

Unbalanced Admissibility Standards and Practices

Doctrine does nothing to guard against some other types of notoriously unreliable evidence that puts innocents at risk. It has long
been recognized, for example, that jailhouse informant or “snitch”
testimony is among the most unreliable types of evidence because
such informants are “incentivized”—they have every incentive to
manufacture false testimony against an accused in hopes of obtaining
108
benefits in their own cases.
And, although one might think that
the source of such testimony (a cellmate of dubious character) might
be obviously unreliable, such testimony can be compelling nonetheless because informants can be convincing liars and because their testimony almost always involves a claimed confession by the defen109
Indeed,
dant—a type of evidence that juries find persuasive.
research on wrongful convictions confirms that jailhouse informant
testimony is a leading cause of wrongful convictions, present in eight110
Yet, generally,
een percent of the first 200 DNA exonerations.
there is no screening of jailhouse informant testimony for reliabil111
ity.
108

See generally ROB WARDEN, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW INCENTIVISED WITNESSES PUT
38 INNOCENT AMERICANS ON DEATH ROW (2002); see also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil:
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1419 (2007).
109
The Canadian inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow, for
example, concluded that jailhouse informants are “polished and convincing liars,”
that jurors give great weight to “confessions,” and that jurors give “the same weight to
‘confessions’ made to jailhouse informants as they [do] to ‘confessions’ made to a
police officer.” PROVINCE OF MANITOBA, MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING
THOMAS SOPHONOW, JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS, THEIR UNRELIABILITY AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE CROWN DISCLOSURE PERTAINING TO THEM, available at http:
//www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/jailhouse/what.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2008).
110
Garrett, supra note 23, at 86. According to the Center on Wrongful Convictions, jailhouse snitch testimony also played a role in 45.9% of the first 111 exonerations of individuals who had been sentenced to death. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (2004–
2005), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
111
Garrett, supra note 23, at 88. “Illinois, after experiencing heightened numbers
of exonerations, is now the only state to require that trial courts conduct reliability
hearings to evaluate jailhouse informants.” Id. (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11521(c) (2003)). A panel of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals also briefly experimented
with a requirement for pretrial reliability hearings related to informant testimony,
but the en banc court quickly vacated that requirement. Dodd v. State, No. F-97-26,
1999 WL 521976, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. Jul. 22, 1999), vacated and reh’g granted, 993
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Courts also routinely admit other evidence of dubious reliability,
including social science or “syndrome” evidence that should not pass
112
serious Daubert scrutiny.
Rape trauma syndrome (RTS) evidence,
for example, is frequently introduced by prosecutors to suggest that
the victim behaved in a way consistent with the manner in which a
rape victim might behave. Janet Hoeffel has noted, however, that the
syndrome is so broad and accommodates such a wide spectrum of
behaviors that it “would seem to leave the only commonality among
113
Hoeffel contends
the victims their self-expressed report of rape.”
that, “[w]ere RTS to be substantively analyzed under Daubert, it would
not pass the test. Research . . . has borne out that there is no identifi114
able and predictable set of behaviors which describe a rape victim.”
Most courts have simply failed to analyze the reliability or scientific
foundations of the syndrome, instead admitting the evidence by rely115
ing on the decisions of other courts accepting the syndrome.
Defendants also have the benefit of lax admissibility standards
for some social science evidence, such as evidence on Battered
Woman Syndrome (BWS). Hoeffel, among others, argues that BWS,
116
like RTS, is not well-grounded in research. She notes that BWS evidence, like RTS evidence, is routinely admitted in American courts,
even though under any serious analysis it cannot clear the Daubert
117
But, Hoeffel contends, BWS is the exception for defense exgate.
P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); see Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How
Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 114 (2006)
(proposing a model statute requiring pre-trial evaluations of informant testimony).
112
Risinger, supra note 12, at 134.
113
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 51.
114
Id. at 55.
115
Id. at 54.
116
Id. at 43–56; see also Regina Schuller & Sara Rzepa, The Scientific Status of Research on Domestic Violence Against Women, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 43–47 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
117
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 43–56. Hoeffel observes that “to date no court has
earnestly evaluated the scientific validity of BWS.” Id. at 47. Applying the Daubert factors, Hoeffel notes that (1) BWS has never been scientifically tested; (2) BWS has not
for the most part been subjected to peer review and publication, but rather has been
printed in the popular press; (3) the error rate has never been determined; and (4)
courts assessing whether the syndrome is “generally accepted” in the relevant field
have “defin[ed] the field narrowly to those who study battered women, as opposed to
social scientists or psychologists generally.” Id. at 48–50. In the end, Hoeffel concludes that “[t]he argument for admissibility on political grounds is an appealing
one,” but that its admissibility across the board cannot be justified under sound evidence law principles. Id. at 50. Rather, she contends it should only be admissible
when proffered by the defendant, despite lack of standing under Daubert, because of
the defendant’s unique constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence, to
present a defense, and to voice. Id.
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pert evidence, which can be explained by political considerations: the
BWS defense benefits a sympathetic, politically significant portion of
118
the population—women who have been abused. By contrast, Hoeffel notes that other social science syndrome evidence that might be
used by criminal defendants and which stands on a scientific footing
similar to BWS, but that would generally apply to much more politically disfavored and disenfranchised groups—inner-city African119
American men—has “barely [seen] the light of day.”
Such syndrome evidence, including Urban Psychosis, Urban Survival Syndrome, or Black Rage theory, could be used to “explain why a defendant believed he was facing imminent bodily harm from another
young African-American man who had his back to him across a court120
yard,” or in the case of Black Rage theory to explain “an uncontrol121
Such
lable rage precipitated by racism and unequal treatment.”
evidence, she argues, has been excluded not because of its faulty scientific underpinnings, but because it would apply broadly and apocalyptically to vast percentages of criminal defendants, and because,
“[w]hile battered women are easily viewed as victims, young African122
American men living in a world of violence are not.” In sum, therefore, she contends that social science evidence is frequently admitted
in an asymmetrical manner—but in a manner that usually disfavors
123
criminal defendants based upon political considerations.
D. Michael Risinger’s analysis of Daubert cases found similarly
that, “[w]hen it comes to ‘summarizational’ or ‘educational’ expertise, prosecution witnesses almost always are allowed to testify, and
124
Prosecutors
defense witnesses are rejected in a majority of cases.”
typically introduce modus operandi witnesses (typically police officers
who testify from their experience concerning the general way crimiHoeffel contends that the real reason that BWS has been accepted by the courts
is that it is generally offered by a politically sympathetic segment of society—abused
women—and thus it is an exception in the world of criminal defense evidence. Id. at
71.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 69.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 70 (quoting Deborah L. Goldklang, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
and Black Rage: Clinical Validity, Criminal Responsibility, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 213, 216
(1997) (arguing that Black Rage meets the criteria for PTSD)).
122
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 71.
123
Id. at 78–79. Hoeffel has argued that, in light of this constitutional preference
for protecting against convicting the innocent, “all reasonable doubts about the reliability of social science evidence in criminal cases [should] be resolved in favor of the
accused—not the cause, person, or matter which society deems politically preferable.” Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 42.
124
Risinger, supra note 12, at 131–32 (footnote omitted).
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nal schemes operate and the usual meaning of criminal slang and
code words). Defendants typically introduce eyewitness identification
experts. The former are almost always allowed, the latter less fre125
quently.
Consistent with this observation, Christopher Slobogin has argued that the heightened reliability scrutiny of Daubert will actually be
detrimental to criminal defendants and will make the system less fair
and reliable because the type of experts that the defense tends to rely
upon will have a harder time passing Daubert scrutiny than will prosecutors’ experts, even though the defense evidence is important to a
126
The defense, he points out, typically presents
search for the truth.
experts involving claims about mental state, “such as insanity, lack of
premeditation, extreme mental or emotional stress, or learned help127
lessness.” The prosecution, on the other hand, he says, “only needs
experts on mental state issues if and when the defense decides to use
128
a mental health professional.” But such social science evidence, he
says, will have a harder time passing Daubert analysis than other scientific or expert evidence because mental states are inherently more
difficult to prove than are questions about past acts; they “are closer
129
In his recent book,
to social constructions than objective facts.”
Proving the Unprovable, Slobogin lays out a compelling argument for
more lenient admissibility of defense state-of-mind evidence, as a
130
matter of fairness and necessity.
As these commentators note, courts do restrict significant defense evidence in ways that undermine the search for the truth. Defendants have long sought, for example, to introduce expert eyewitness identification evidence to address a wide variety of counterintuitive features of human perception and memory that juries need
131
to understand when evaluating eyewitness testimony.
While courts

125

Id. at 132.
Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL
L. REV. 105, 109 (2003).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 109–10.
129
Id. at 110.
130
SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 39–40. To compensate for its inherent unprovability, Slobogin offers a rule of admissibility that he calls “generally accepted content
validity,” which would provide meaningful standards for reviewing state-of-mind expert evidence without unduly limiting its admissibility. Id. at 62.
131
For a valuable history of the attempts to use psychology to inform the law’s understanding of eyewitnesses, see JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS,
SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION (2004).
126
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recently have become somewhat more receptive to such testimony,
by and large courts considering the admissibility of eyewitness reli133
ability expertise have excluded it. Yet, of all the social sciences, expertise on eyewitness fallibility is some of the most rigorously tested
and scientific; it “is an example of how ‘soft science’ can be ‘good sci134
It has been subjected to decades of laboratory tests and
ence.’”
some field research. As others have concluded, a strict Daubert analysis would lead to admitting expert witness testimony on eyewitness
135
Nonetheless, most courts still reject the testimony,
identifications.
136
although typically for reasons other than reliability —such as mis-

132

See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 786
F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265, 278 (Cal. 2000); State v.
Dubray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003); State v. Shomberg, 709 N.W.2d 370, 376
(Wis. 2006) (upholding exclusion of expert testimony, but noting that, “were this
case to come before the circuit court today, given the developments that have occurred in the interim [including expanding judicial understanding of the research],
it is highly likely that the judge would have allowed the expert to testify on factors
that influence identification and memory”).
133
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1326.
[A] review of the case law shows that the overwhelming majority of
courts considering the admissibility of eyewitness reliability expertise
have excluded it from trial. Of the federal courts of appeals, seven circuits have upheld the exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony, and only two circuits have upheld the admission of the testimony. Of the state court decisions since Daubert, all eighteen states
considering the evidence have upheld its exclusion.
Id. at 1329 (citations and footnotes omitted); SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 30.
134
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 64 (citing Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological
Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and Science, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229, 256 (1995); Wells et al., supra note 103, at 604.
135
See United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he science
of eyewitness perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology, and reliability of any psychological research.” (internal quotations omitted)); Peter J. Cohen,
How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness
Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 276–78 (1996) (arguing that expertise on eyewitness errors passes Daubert because it is testable and has been tested extensively; the
data has been subjected to extensive publication and peer review; while the error
rate of the research itself may not be discoverable, the research has demonstrated a
high rate of error in eyewitness testimony; and the expertise has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community); Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1331.
136
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1325 (“The judicial decisions on the admission of
eyewitness reliability expertise represent an example of . . . irrationality. Of the myriad forms of social science evidence which have entered through the courtroom
doors, perhaps the most well-researched of those is expertise on eyewitness reliability.”); Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 64 (citing Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013,
1032 (1995)).
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137

placed concerns that it will invade the province of the jury, or that
138
it provides nothing beyond the ken of ordinary people, or because
it is not based specifically on the facts of the given case or contact
139
with the eyewitness involved.
Courts are even less receptive to other sorts of expert testimony,
such as expert testimony about false confessions. Confession evidence is some of the most powerful evidence that can be offered
against a criminal defendant because people commonly believe that
140
if a person confessed, he must be guilty. It is truly counter-intuitive
to believe that a person would confess to a crime he did not commit,
especially a heinous violent crime. But the postconviction DNA exonerations prove that people do indeed confess falsely and for a variety of reasons. Of the first 200 postconviction DNA exoneration
141
Defense expercases, sixteen percent involved a false confession.
tise can be important in helping jurors understand not only that false
confessions do occur, but also the factors that can lead a person to
142
confess falsely. False confession theory has been subjected to study,
143
although not nearly as much study as eyewitness fallibility.
Janet
Hoeffel concludes that “[f]alse confession theory appears to have a

137

Research consistently demonstrates that expert testimony on eyewitness fallibility does not overwhelm jurors or make them too unwilling to accept eyewitness identifications, but rather helps them better understand such testimony. See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Preventing Mistaken Convictions in Eyewitness Identification Trials:
The Case Against Traditional Safeguards, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 89, 114 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina
Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133, 173 (1989).
138
Research also demonstrates that lay people, including jurors and judges, harbor significant misconceptions about human memory and perception; expertise does
indeed provide information that is counter-intuitive and therefore beyond the ken or
ordinary jurors. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 137, at 114; Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 432 (2004).
139
SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 30. Slobogin notes that this makes little sense, as
this evidence is “social framework evidence par excellence.” Id. He elaborates that
“[s]imply because information is general does not make it irrelevant to an individual
situation.” Id. at 36. Indeed, many courts limit such testimony to such nomothetic
evidence, as opposed to case-specific, idiopathic testimony. Id.
140
Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of
the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 56–58 (2004); Richard A.
Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra note 47, at 36.
141
Garrett, supra note 23, at 60.
142
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 66.
143
For a summary of much of the false confession research literature, see Leo et
al., supra note 105, at 514–20.
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144

reliability level on par with BWS or RTS.” Yet most courts have disallowed false confession expert testimony, even though they admit
145
BWS and RTS testimony.
Perhaps even more troubling from the perspective of concern
for protecting the innocent are doctrinal rules that expressly embrace
limitations on the defendant’s ability to present a defense. Most notable in this regard is the direct connection doctrine, or its variants,
which imposes significant limitations on the ability of defendants to
146
introduce evidence of alternate or third-party suspects. Third-party
perpetrator evidence is not admissible in most jurisdictions merely if
it is relevant. Rather, under the direct connection doctrine, the evidence must be both relevant in the traditional sense (i.e., it must
147
have a “tendency” to make the defendant’s guilt “less probable” ),
148
The rule freand it must have a “direct connection” to the crime.
quently excludes evidence of strong motive or opportunity because
courts often require “direct evidence placing the third party at the
149
Because this rule imposes a super-relevancy requirement
scene.”
144

Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 66. Although false confession testimony is generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community, some argue that more research is
needed before it can meet the Daubert standards for admissibility. See Major James R.
Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1999, at
26, 39–43.
145
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 67. In one notable exception, in which real doubts
about the defendant’s guilt existed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the lower court misapplied Daubert in disallowing false confession testimony
and remanded for consideration under the proper standards. United States v. Hall,
93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
146
Different jurisdictions use different terminology to describe the direct connection requirement, including “clearly link,” “point directly,” “point unerringly,” “inherent tendency,” or “legitimate tendency,” but all essentially have the same effect.
See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 343 n.337.
147
FED. R. EVID. 401.
148
See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 342–45, 355–65; David McCord, “But Perry
Mason Made It Look So Easy!”: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant
to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 917, 921 (1996); Ellen Yankiver
Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in
Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1675 (2000).
149
State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 1999). The United States Supreme Court recently invalidated one of the most onerous versions of this rule.
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). In Holmes, the South Carolina Supreme Court had held that a defendant may not introduce proof of third-party guilt
if the prosecution had introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supported a guilty verdict. Id. at 323–24. While acknowledging the widely accepted
general limitations on third-party-perpetrator evidence, the Court held that South
Carolina’s variation of the rule went too far and violated the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. Id. at 329–31. The Court noted that, under South
Carolina’s rule, if the prosecution appeared to have a strong case, no third-party guilt
evidence, no matter how powerful or direct, was admissible. Id. This, the Court said,
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on the defendant’s ability to tell her story of innocence, it is hard to
reconcile the rule with a professed overriding concern for protecting
150
the innocent.
Similarly, the statements against penal interest exception to the
hearsay rule asymmetrically burdens defense evidence of innocence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 creates a hearsay exception for statements against penal interest if the declarant was unavailable at the
151
The rule, however, uniquely disfavors such evidence
time of trial.
when offered by criminal defendants to show that someone else
might have committed the crime. The rule provides: “A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum152
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”
The
rule does not similarly burden such evidence when offered by the
prosecution in a criminal case, or when offered by any party in a civil
action. Again, such skewing of admissibility standards is hard to rec153
oncile with an overriding commitment to protecting the innocent.
Eleanor Swift has also shown, in her contribution to this symposium, that courts apply disparate standards of admissibility for “contextual” evidence offered to complete the narratives presented by the
parties. Drawing on narrative relevance, the story model of trial, and
the relative plausibility theory of jury decision-making, she notes the
importance of context-rich information to a party’s ability to convince a jury of the truthfulness of his story, of his version of the
154
She notes that the Supreme Court, in Old Chief v. United
truth.

“does not rationally serve the end that the [direct connection doctrine was] designed
to promote, i.e., to focus the trial on the central issues by excluding evidence that has
only a very weak logical connection to the central issues.” Id. at 330. The Court was
also troubled by the asymmetry created by the South Carolina rule: “The rule applied
in this case is no more logical than its converse would be, i.e., a rule barring the
prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant is able
to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a verdict
of not guilty.” Id. at 330.
150
See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 355–65.
151
FED. R. EVID. 804(a), (b)(3).
152
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
153
See James Joseph Duane, The Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence
608(b) and 8804(b)(3): Two Great Ideas that Don’t Go Far Enough, 209 F.R.D. 235, 244–48
(2002); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 345–46, 355–65 (explaining that the rule is
based on distrust of defense exculpatory evidence, and arguing that such distrust is
misplaced); Peter W. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851,
978–1011 (1981); Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay
from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1113–28 (1987).
154
Swift, supra note 58.
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155

States, implicitly acknowledged “the narrative theory of decision
making that underlies the story model”—at least when offered by the
prosecution. She notes that Old Chief “places the Court’s imprimatur
on the prosecution’s ability to use evidence of ‘guiltiness,’ not just of
156
‘guilt,’ in order to help ‘tell an involving and coherent story’” —a
development that others, such as Michael Risinger, have decried as
permitting prejudicial “heartstrings and gore” evidence to infect the
157
But Swift shows that such context evitrial on questions of guilt.
dence is not admitted evenly. In particular, she demonstrates how
courts tend to apply the state-of-mind hearsay exception under Fed158
eral Rule of Evidence 803(3) to exclude defendants’ statements
about their then-existing state of mind, even though such evidence
should be admissible under Rule 803(3), and even though it may be
critical context information needed to make a defendant’s narrative
159
complete and plausible.
Finally, some rules that put innocents at risk do so not by excluding defense evidence outright, but by burdening its introduction. For
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which permits crossexamination of a testifying defendant about her prior record, can
prevent even an innocent defendant from taking the stand to tell the
160
truth.
Accordingly, John Blume has argued that, because the current legal regime discourages even factually innocent defendants
161
from telling their (true) stories at trial, the law should be changed.
He argues that only prior convictions for perjury should be poten162
tially available for impeachment purposes.
155

519 U.S. 172 (1997).
Swift, supra note 58. Old Chief holds that it was error, in a trial for assault with a
dangerous weapon and felon in possession of a firearm, to allow the prosecution to
present evidence about the nature of the defendant’s prior conviction, rather than to
accept his stipulation that he had a prior felony conviction. But in the course of so
holding, the Court also declared that, in other circumstances, context evidence
might be admissible “not just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance,
and so to implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in
judgment.” 519 U.S. at 187–88. The Court embraced evidence that seeks “as much
to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors
that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable.” Id. at 188.
157
Risinger, supra note 1, at 1307.
158
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (creating a hearsay exception for statement about “[t]hen
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”).
159
Swift, supra note 58.
160
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1014181.
161
Id.
162
Id.
156
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In sum, these admissibility patterns are perverse, at least if we
take seriously our professed commitment to protecting the innocent
as a highest-order value. While the system is not and cannot be symmetrical, it turns out that ours is asymmetrical in ways that compromise our commitment to protecting the innocent. But given the constitution’s preference for giving voice and protection to criminal
defendants, any asymmetry in admissibility should favor the defense,
163
not the prosecution.
Hoeffel, for example, argues that psychological syndrome evidence such as BWS and RTS should generally be subjected to rigorous admissibility analysis under Daubert when offered by
the prosecution, but that it should be more freely admitted when offered by the defense, in recognition of the defendant’s constitutional
164
right to present a defense.
Similarly, Slobogin contends that
criminal defendants should have greater leeway in introducing defensive state-of-mind evidence: “[T]he criminal defendant, the party
most likely to use mental health professionals to support culpability
claims, has a special entitlement to voice, stemming from both constitutional and procedural justice principles. That entitlement . . .
165
should trump concerns about scientific reliability.” Moreover, a
number of scholars have argued cogently that there should be even
greater leeway for defense experts on matters such as eyewitness fallibility, false confessions, and states of mind—matters that are all

163

Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 100, 113–17
(1999).
164
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 78. Hoeffel argues that
[w]hen faced with proffers of social science evidence on behalf of defendants, the courts must [apply right-to-present-a-defense principles]
and admit the evidence, even if it is not Daubert-reliable, as long as it
does not rise to such a level of untrustworthiness that the traditional
tools of advocacy—cross-examination and hiring a prosecution expert
for rebuttal are ineffective.
Id. But, she contends, “the courts must hold the prosecution’s evidence up to
Daubert’s light and engage in the honest assessments of the reliability of evidence that
they have been avoiding.” Id. at 79. Hoeffel notes that other commentators have
similarly proposed such differing burdens of proof for the defense and prosecution.
Id. at 79 n.235 (citing Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1248 (1980); David
McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 105–06 (1987);
Slobogin, supra note 163, at 113; Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice
Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 117–19 (1993)).
165
SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 40.
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counter-intuitive—because such counter-intuitive information is par166
ticularly needed by and helpful to juries.
As things stand, however, criminal defendants are handicapped
not only by their ability to generate their own evidence, but also by
rules that fail to protect them from unreliable prosecution evidence
and rules that burden their ability to present exculpatory evidence.
And, as Part III will demonstrate, this asymmetry in the criminal justice system is particularly pronounced where forensic science evidence is concerned.
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
A. Adversary Failure
Forensic sciences have proven to be an especially difficult field
for criminal defendants. For a variety of reasons, the way the criminal
justice system handles forensic science evidence puts innocents at
risk.
Considerable judicial and scholarly attention has been focused
on problems attendant to the “battle of the experts” in civil litiga167
tion.
Regardless of how serious those problems might be in civil
cases, at least in that arena there is a real “battle” between competing
forces, which is essential to the proper functioning of the adversary
system. Although not always true, in civil cases both adversaries frequently bring ample resources and a cadre of well-compensated ex168
But in criminal cases,
perts to a relatively balanced playing field.
where the stakes are so much higher, there often is no serious adversary testing of forensic sciences. Typically, the field is anything but
169
level.
As suggested above, the government has significantly greater access to forensic science services and experts than do most criminal
defendants. Crime laboratories exist to provide such services to

166
Id. at 79 (“[P]robative testimony tending to support an insanity, provocation,
or lack of mens rea defense ought to be considered helpful because it rebuts legal
and lay preconceptions about mental state.”); Risinger, supra note 1, at 1313.
167
See generally Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999); Richard H. Underwood, “X-Spurt” Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995).
168
See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991); see also Risinger, supra note 1, at 1310.
169
Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2003) (“Instead of worrying about the ‘hired gun’ phenomenon
as in civil litigation, the criminal defense lawyer often lacks money for any ‘gun.’”).
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prosecutors; no corresponding institutions exist for defendants.
And, because most defendants are indigent, their ability to hire experts is dependent on public funding of legal services to the indigent,
171
Bewhich is abysmally inadequate in virtually every jurisdiction.
cause funding for indigent defense is so inadequate, defense services
are rationed in ways that put innocents at risk; rationing disfavors expensive, substantive innocence claims (such as expensive litigation
about the validity of forensic evidence), and instead favors more in172
While the Supreme
expensive procedural constitutional claims.
173
Court in Ake v. Oklahoma recognized a constitutional right to publicly funded experts for the indigent, exercise of that right is dependent on the willingness of a local judge to order the expenditure of
scarce local resources, and on a cumbersome case-by-case, expert-byexpert process for requesting funding. Any risk of failure of that
case-by-case process to provide adequate expert services falls on the
174
defendant, and courts have tended to apply Ake narrowly. That sys-

170
Indeed, a survey in 1985 revealed that seventy-nine percent of all laboratories
were “located within law enforcement/public safety agencies.” Joseph L. Peterson et
al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation’s Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985); see Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84
J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 118 (1993) (while “[o]btaining expert assistance is
generally not a problem for the prosecution, which has access to the services of state,
county, or metropolitan crime laboratories . . . [f]orensic laboratory services . . . are
not generally available to criminal defendants”).
171
See Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra
note 47, at 220, 226; Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994); Brown, supra
note 24, at 1590 (noting that, because “defense counsel’s commitment is not to accuracy; it is to his or her clients, many of whom want inaccuracy to mask their guilt,”
“[l]egislatures . . . have responded to Court mandates for defense counsel by consistently underfunding defenders in order to constrain their effectiveness”).
172
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1997).
173
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
174
See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1095 (quoting STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL
J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000) (“Generally speaking the
courts have read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert
unless it is absolutely essential to the defense.”)); Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman,
When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 SCI. AM. 46, 50 (1990) (noting DNA cases in
which the defense did not retain any experts “because the presiding judge had refused to authorize funds”); see also JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND
INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 202 (2006) (describing how an Oklahoma trial court denied Ron Williamson’s request for an expert to assist his defense, despite his pressing
need for such assistance; Williamson was convicted and sentenced to death, only to
be exonerated by DNA testing years later).
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tem comes nowhere close to providing the level of forensic sciences
175
assistance that is needed, or that is available to the prosecution.
A corollary, and perhaps in part an outgrowth, of that system is
that prosecutors have the ability to organize themselves into special
units with expertise in various forensic sciences. A particular prosecutor or unit of prosecutors, at least in larger jurisdictions or in State
Justice Departments that can assist smaller local prosecutors’ offices,
can become expert, for example, in DNA analysis or other types of
176
scientific evidence.
Then, when a case with significant scientific
evidence in those areas arises, those prosecutors are assigned to
prosecute or assist local prosecutors in those cases.
The defense bar is not similarly organized. Most defense lawyers
operate on their own, with little assistance from any other lawyers
(except in capital cases, where it is common to have two or sometimes
more attorneys assigned). Typically, the lawyers are assigned or hired
to take whatever cases arise, without regard to specialized expertise.
Public defender services in many states are not organized beyond the
county level, and appointments are still made in many jurisdictions by
177
Even in states with organized statewide public delocal courts.
fender services, the kind of organization that prosecutors bring to
bear is unusual. Simply put, “[p]rosecutors are much better at sharing information than defense attorneys[, in part] because the government is by its nature a more coherent entity than the defense bar,
but . . . also because the state is better able to anticipate the scientific
178
issues that will arise and act accordingly.”
Without organized assistance, the defense bar as a whole is generally unprepared to utilize or challenge scientific evidence adequately. Most lawyers have no training or experience in the sciences
and are naturally intimidated and overwhelmed by scientific evi-

175

See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535, 539 (2005) (describing the inadequacy of defense expert funding under federal statutory schemes
and Ake).
176
For an example of some of a prosecutor’s trailblazing work with DNA, see DNA
Links Prisoner to Death 18 Years Ago: Homicide Charges Filed in Milwaukee Cold-Case Slaying, WIS. ST. J., Jan. 29, 2008, at B5. In Wisconsin, for example, Milwaukee County
Assistant District Attorney Norm Gahn has become the state’s acknowledged expert
in DNA evidence. Id. Gahn has served on former Attorney General Janet Reno’s National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, and pioneered innovative uses of
DNA in criminal prosecutions. Id. When high-profile and complicated DNA prosecutions have arisen, anywhere in the State, Gahn has been called in to assist in the
prosecution. Id.
177
Bernhard, supra note 171, at 227.
178
Slobogin, supra note 126, at 117.
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179

dence.
As a consequence, until recently most of the forensic sciences utilized by prosecutors were rarely challenged by defense lawyers, but were merely accepted as good science, whose results were
180
presumed valid.
181
In Daubert, and subsequently in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and
then Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court provided a new framework for
screening scientific and expert evidence, which appeared to promise
rigorous scrutiny of the forensic sciences. Daubert broke dramatically
from the admissibility standard that had been established in Frye v.
182
United States.
Under Frye, courts admitted scientific evidence if it
183
Frye essenwas “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field.
tially deferred questions of reliability and scientific validity to the scientists who were proponents or practitioners in that particular scien184
tific or technical field. Frye was criticized because it admitted “bad”
185
science—“junk science” —by allowing scientists to “self-validate”
their own fields, while at the same time excluding some “good” sci186
ence simply if it was too new to have gained general acceptance.
179
See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed.
1986) (“[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy,
which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility
of evidence proffered through expert witnesses.”); Jonakait, supra note 5, at 348, 349
(noting that, even with an experienced and respected defense lawyer, “when it came
to the scientific and mathematical testimony, the adversary system ceased to exist and
the evidence was not challenged,” and that, “[p]erhaps as a group, attorneys are reasonably bright people who became lawyers partly because they were afraid of science
and math”).
180
Nearly twenty years ago Peter Neufeld and Neville Colman observed that, because they lack an adequate scientific background, “lawyers rarely do more than review the qualifications of the expert (typically based on perfunctory queries about
institutional affiliation and publications) and verify the facts on which the expert’s
conclusions are based.” Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 49; see also id. at 52
(describing how, when DNA was first used in criminal prosecutions, defense attorneys almost always “failed to obtain the raw population data on which conclusions
about allele frequencies were predicated,” “failed to present any expert witnesses” of
their own, and engaged in only “perfunctory” cross-examination of the prosecution’s
experts).
181
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
182
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
183
Id. at 1014.
184
Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230 (2000) (“Frye-like tests allowed judges to piggy-back
their decisions onto someone else’s judgment of whether the proffered evidence was
sufficiently valid to be admitted.”).
185
See HUBER, supra note 168, at 14–15 (1993). But see generally Gary Edmond &
David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (criticizing the
“junk science” argument).
186
See Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1319. Michael Saks has observed that “the Frye test
suffers from a special paradox: because less rigorous fields will reach a state of ‘gen-
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Daubert changed that; under Daubert, “[j]udges, and not scientists,
187
Daubert inwould now be the ‘gatekeepers’ of scientific evidence.”
188
structs judges to scrutinize the reliability of the scientific or technical evidence instead of deferring to the general acceptance of the sci189
entists. To undertake this gatekeeping role, Daubert says, courts are
to apply a flexible approach, which should include consideration of
four factors in particular: whether the theory or technique can be
and has been tested; whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; the technique’s known or potential error rate; and whether the theory or technique is generally
190
These are the
accepted in the relevant field (the Frye element).
tools, the Supreme Court instructs, that lawyers and courts should
rigorously apply to screen scientific and technical evidence for reliability.

eral acceptance’ more readily than more rigorous fields, courts employing Frye will
more readily admit the offerings of less dependable fields and less readily admit the
offerings of more dependable fields.” Saks, supra note 184, at 231.
187
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1320.
188
In scientific terms, “reliability” refers to a scientific test’s consistency, that is, its
ability to replicate its results in repeated examinations, while “validity” refers to a
test’s accuracy, that is, its ability to measure what it claims to measure. See 1 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 116, at § 4-2.3; Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence:
Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 911 (1998). Daubert generally uses “reliability” to
include what in scientific terms would be considered both “reliability” and “validity.”
See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans
that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1068
(2001). In this Article, I use “reliability” in the lay sense as it is used in Daubert, to include both scientific validity and reliability.
189
To be sure, Daubert was viewed initially and in part as loosening the admissibility of scientific evidence because it would permit courts to admit new scientific theories or techniques before they could be said to have obtained “general acceptance.”
See Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1317–18, 1318 n.233. Hoeffel notes that, in Daubert, the
Court stated that “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with
the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony.’” Id. at 1318 n.233 (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)). But Daubert also promised to impose more searching judicial scrutiny of scientific reliability, by shifting the gatekeeping role to the courts. Id. at 1320. And by the time the Court had decided Joiner and
Kumho Tire, the Court had clearly signaled that it was “moving from a liberal standard
of admissibility as suggested in Daubert, to an exacting standard.” Giannelli, supra
note 170, at 1080; see also David L. Faigmen, et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert
Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 656 (2000) (noting
that Daubert generally raised the height of the admissibility bar, but that it is more
liberal than Frye “when the expert evidence is solid, but on the cutting edge, and
therefore not generally accepted”). By the time the Court decided Weisgram v. Marley
Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the Court said that Daubert imposed “exacting standards of
reliability.” Id. at 455.
190
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
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That rigorous screening, however, has not materialized with respect to forensic science evidence offered by the prosecution in
criminal cases. “Fingerprints, handwriting comparison, microscopic
hair analysis, fiber analysis, ballistics, arson investigations, forensic
odontology—indeed most of the forensic sciences—have become fixtures in criminal cases, and until recently their reliability, objectivity,
and claim to scientific foundation—and hence admissibility—have
191
scarcely been the subject of inquiry.”
Peter Neufeld has observed
that Daubert’s promise of rigorous screening for scientific reliability
has not materialized in criminal cases because defense lawyers rarely
raise serious Daubert challenges to the prosecution’s forensic science
192
Empirical data confirms that little adversary testing of
evidence.
scientific evidence or experts is offered in criminal cases, both in the
193
United States and Great Britain.
Yet many commentators have noted that much of the forensic
science evidence used to obtain convictions is of dubious scientific va194
lidity and would not pass scrutiny if Daubert were applied rigorously.
Proficiency testing of the forensic individualization sciences (those
that purport to match an individual to a piece of evidence) consis191
Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Innocence Projects in Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 245 (2006); see Michael J. Saks &
Jonathan Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI.
892, 892–94 (2005).
192
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107–10.
193
Risinger, supra note 12, at 135; Lois Rogers, The Expert as Judge and Jury, TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 18, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article
2889323.ece (“A study by senior barrister Penny Cooper of City University in London, has shown that the majority of lawyers and judges do not bother to check the
qualifications of experts they approach to bolster an aspect of their case.”).
194
See, e.g., Saks, supra note 184, at 237–40 (2000); ERICA BEECHER-MONAS,
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL
DUE PROCESS 94–95 (2007) (“Many time-honored methods of criminal identification,
such as hair analysis, voice spectography, and bitemark identification, to name a few,
have turned out to have no better foundation than ancient divination rituals.”). As
Randolph Jonakait has explained,
little or no meaningful testing has ever been performed on many forensic science procedures. Little is also known about the true error
rates for almost all forensic science techniques. The few disclosed error rates, however, are shockingly high. Most forensic science operates
outside of the peer review systems, and forensic science is seldom published. While forensic science techniques are accepted in forensic science, many are not accepted by a broader scientific community. Furthermore, the techniques accepted in forensic science are not used in
such a way that would reveal their methodological flaws, if any.
In other words, if Daubert is taken seriously, then much of forensic
science is in serious trouble.
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103, 2117 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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195

tently shows alarmingly high error rates.
One glimpse of the problem is revealed by the fact that use of fraudulent, mistaken, or misleading forensic science contributed to fifty-five percent of the first
196
As others have pointed out, hair micros200 DNA exonerations.
copy has little scientific basis and has been exposed as wrong by DNA
197
testing of the examined hairs in a significant percentage of cases.
Serology tests, even though themselves usually reliable, have been
misused in many wrongful conviction cases (serology evidence was
used in forty percent of the wrongful convictions exposed by post198
conviction DNA testing).
Comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA)
has recently been abandoned after decades of use because an exhaustive analysis by the National Research Council concluded that there
was no scientific basis for the claim that it could “match” crime scene
199
Other forensic “sciences,” inbullets to particular boxes of bullets.
200
cluding traditional ballistics identification, bite mark identifica201
202
tion, and handwriting analysis, among others, similarly lack a

195
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 109, 109–24 (1991) (describing the results of various proficiency tests).
196
Garrett, supra note 23, at 59–60, 75.
197
Garrett, supra note 23, at 83 (noting that, of the first 200 DNA exoneration
cases, 43 (22%) involved false hair or fiber comparisons); Giannelli, supra note 169,
at 1074–76, 1096–97 (citing high error rates in hair microscopy cases, cases in which
examiner error was exposed through postconviction DNA testing, and cases in which
the scientific basis for the technique has been challenged); Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Forensic Science: Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514, 514 (2001);
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107–08; Clive A. Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic
Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 290–91 (1996) (discussing the questionable scientific
foundation of microscopic hair analysis).
198
See Garrett, supra note 23, at 81; Jonakait, supra note 195, at 111; Jonakait, supra
note 5, at 349 (describing the misuse of serology evidence in a case); Neufeld, supra
note 12, at S108.
199
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE
(2004) [hereinafter NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE]; Jane Campbell Moriarty, Misconvictions, Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007); John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1.
200
See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096–98; Joan Griffin & David J. LaMagna,
Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, CHAMPION,
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 20–21.
201
See GRISHAM, supra note 174, at 263 (describing the flawed bite mark evidence
in Greg Wilhoit’s wrongful conviction); I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for
Human Bitemark Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85 (2001); Giannelli, supra
note 169, at 1096–98; Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science:
Testimony on Bite Marks Prone to Error, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2004, at 1; Flynn McRoberts,
Bite-Mark Verdict Faces New Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2004, at 1.
202
See D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Exper-
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solid foundation in science, and have been misused to convict innocent people. And even more venerable forensic evidence, such as
203
204
205
fingerprints and DNA typing, have produced proven errors.
Worse yet, even in cases where crime laboratory analysts engaged
in outright fraud, the defense bar has failed to scrutinize or challenge
the work of those analysts. Scandals such as the faked work of Fred
206
207
Zain in West Virginia and Joyce Gilchrist in Oklahoma, as well as
tise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 734 (1989); Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096 & n.150
(citing cases).
203
Simon Cole has catalogued twenty-two cases in which fingerprint evidence was
mistaken. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 991 (2005). Among the mistaken
fingerprint matches, one of the most notorious in recent years is that of Brandon
Mayfield. FBI analysts investigating the Madrid terrorist bombing in 2004 matched
Mayfield’s fingerprints to a crime scene print, claiming the match was “a 100% identification.” Id. at 985–86. Subsequent analysis by Spanish authorities linked the print
to Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian national living in Spain, and the FBI eventually conceded that its analysts had erred. Id. at 986; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON
MAYFIELD CASE (2006); Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096–97 & n.152 (citing cases);
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime
Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 203–05 (2008); Neufeld, supra note 12, at S108. For an interesting analysis of Judge Pollak’s two conflicting fingerprint opinions in United
States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) and 188 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Pa. 2002), see Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56, at 66–74.
204
Of the first 200 DNA exonerations, three involved faulty DNA evidence introduced at trial. Garrett, supra note 23, at 81, 84.
205
For error rates on many of these identification sciences, see Saks & Koehler,
supra note 191, at 895.
206
As the Chief Serologist in West Virginia for ten years, Fred Zain engaged in a
pattern of overstating and misrepresenting the results of laboratory analyses, reporting results that were impossible or reporting results on tests never conducted. See In
re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501,
503 (W. Va. 1993). Zain’s misconduct was so rampant that the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that, “as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary
evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed
invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible in determining whether to award a new trial in
any subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.” Id. at 506 (quoting judicial Report of
Judge James O. Holliday); see also George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from
the “Fred Zain Affair”, CHAMPION, May 1999, at 12–13; Giannelli, supra note 203, at
172–74.
207
Raeder, supra note 108.
Joyce Gilchrist, an African-American forensic chemist, known as “Black
Magic” for her ability to sway juries with evidence only she could see, was
later investigated when many of her incorrect hair analyses were disclosed by DNA exonerations. In a reversal of one of her more egregious
cases, the court found that she knew her testimony was false and misleading because it was contradicted by evidence that was withheld from the
defense.
Id. at 1421 (citing Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 TULSA L. REV. 209, 236
(2006), and Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Gian-
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other fraudulent or sloppy work in places like Montana, the FBI
209
210
Crime Laboratory, and the Houston Crime Laboratory, among
211
many others, went undetected for long periods of time because de212
fense counsel failed to scrutinize and challenge their work.
Part of the problem with the forensic sciences has been that they
have emerged and flourished in a setting and culture that is far different than that for academic sciences. Almost all of the forensic sciences developed in police crime laboratories to aid the investigation

nelli, supra note 203, at 174–82; Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A1.
208
In Montana, hair microscopist Arnold “‘Melnikoff repeatedly used an invalid
system of hair analysis’ which always seemed to ‘place defendants at the scenes of
Montana’s most heinous crimes.’” Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
299, 377 n.373 (2007) (quoting Charlie Gillis, Scandal in the Forensic Labs: Hundreds of
Cases Undergoing Review in Montana, NAT’L POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at B1); see also Giannelli, supra note 203, at 182–85; Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who
Erred on ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24.
209
Even the elite FBI Crime Laboratory has been touched by scandal, including
cases in which analysts “gave inaccurate and incomplete testimony and testified to
invalid opinions that appeared tailored to the most incriminating result.” OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: INVESTIGATION INTO
THE LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVE-RELATED AND
OTHER CASES, Executive Summary pt. III, § C. (Apr. 1997); see also OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF
PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES (2004).
210
See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 755 (2007) (describing scandal
over shoddy work in the Houston Crime Laboratory). According to Dr. Elizabeth
Johnson, a former medical examiner with the Harris County Medical Examiner’s Office, Houston Police Department examiners “intentionally mislead . . . . And in all
the cases . . . they always mislead in favor of a conviction.” Cooley, supra note 208, at
377 n.373 (quoting Steve McVicker, Lab Chief’s Testimony in 3 Cases Questioned: Court
Transcripts Show HPD Work Was Wrong, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 29, 2003, at A37); see
also Giannelli, supra note 203, at 187–92.
211
See Garrett, supra note 23, at 64 (noting that scandals “have occurred at DNA
laboratories in at least seventeen states”); Giannelli, supra note 203, at 166–208 (describing lab problems in Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Fort Worth,
Montana, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Seattle, Virginia, West Virginia, the FBI, and
other jurisdictions); Murphy, supra note 210, at 755 n.154 (citing scandal and malfeasance at numerous laboratories around the country). For a recent account of forensic fraud in Ohio, see DNA Proves Forensic Analyst Gave False Testimony, NORTH
COUNTRY GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2008, available at http://www.northcountrygazette.org/
news/2008/02/15/false_forensic_testimony. For a recent account of ethical lapses
and mistakes in the State of Washington toxicology lab, see Rachel La Corte, Head of
WA State Patrol Forensic Lab Bureau Resigns, THE COLUMBIAN, Feb. 14, 2008, available at
http://news.columbian.com/news/state/APStories/AP02152008news278407.cfm.
212
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107, S109.
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213

and prosecution of crimes. Most have no corollary in the academic
214
sciences; they are not studied, taught, or tested in academic settings
where reliability and accuracy—scientific “truth”—are the only values.
Rather, they are developed and utilized in the adversarial world of
crime investigation and prosecution, where those developing and
evaluating the methods have an incentive to assume or accept their
215
validity because they are useful in producing evidence of guilt.
216
Apart from DNA, almost all of the individualization forensic sciences, including the most venerated of the pre-DNA forensic sci213

William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science of Forensic DNA Testing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1997).
214
See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 148 (“Unlike many other endeavors, forensic
science is often unable to adopt scientific knowledge and techniques from related
areas. Frequently, there is no related discipline to draw upon.”).
215
Thompson, supra note 213, at 1113–18. Thompson argues that “[f]orensic scientists play a fundamentally different role in society than do academic scientists. The
major imperative of the academic scientist is to advance scientific knowledge—to
find truth through the use of the scientific method.” Id. at 1113. For forensic scientists, on the other hand, Thompson says the “major purpose is to provide a service to
a client by answering specific questions about evidence.” Id. at 1114. Accordingly,
“forensic scientists have incentives to put the best possible face on their work, to
promote the impression that their techniques are accurate and reliable and that
their conclusions are trustworthy.” Id. Thompson maintains that forensic scientists
thus have incentives to “avoid openly raising questions about the reliability of forensic tests, avoid public discussion of technical problems or concerns, and refrain from
publicly criticizing the work of other forensic scientists.” Id. And, because the forensic scientist’s primary client is law enforcement, forensic scientists are susceptible to
being co-opted so that they “adopt the goals of their clients as their own,” which “is
problematic because the goals of law enforcement sometimes conflict with the goals
of scientific objectivity and neutrality.” Id. at 1115; see Risinger, supra note 12, at 126
(DNA is distinguished among the forensic “sciences” because “DNA science is real
science. It was initially developed in academic scientific research for reasons having
nothing directly to do with its courtroom applications. It deals with a purely empirical issue appropriate to resolution by normal scientific methods.”) (footnotes omitted); Saks, supra note 184, at 240–41 (noting that the forensic identification sciences
“have little or no existence outside the courts. They have few academic and no
commercial counterparts that would carry out testing and development for their own
purposes.”). Paul Giannelli elaborates:
[T]he research scientists who testified as experts in the DNA cases (for
both the prosecution and defense) came from a “scientific” culture,
unlike the many forensic examiners who work in crime laboratories
and are sometimes described as “cops in lab coats.” The DNA scientists
were comfortable with quality control procedures, demanded written
protocols, viewed proficiency testing as a positive development, and believed in open science and “not trial by ambush.” All this was new to
forensic science, which had grown to maturity in an adversarial environment.”
Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1106–07 (footnotes omitted).
216
“DNA typing is the exception. It is the first individualization science derived
from traditional science.” Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science:
Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, JUDGES J., Fall 2006, at 16–17.
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ences—fingerprint analysis—are premised on untested assumptions
217
and unknown error rates, are not supported by statistical analyses
218
that measure the significance of any purported matches, are ulti219
220
mately subjective, and hence are sometimes flat wrong.
When defense challenges to forensic science evidence are
brought, they are usually ineffectual. Noting that most criminal defendants are represented by poorly funded public defenders, contract
attorneys, or appointed counsel, Neufeld observes:
Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. Even when the most
vulnerable forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and
handwriting—are attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing. Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge with appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined to
mount a Daubert challenge, they lack the requisite knowledge and
221
skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.

Neufeld’s assessment is confirmed by data compiled by Michael
Risinger, who examined every one of the 1600 state and federal cases
in the Westlaw database that cited Daubert between Daubert’s date of
217

See Cooley, supra note 51, at 397 (noting that “error rates for many forensic scientists are not known”); Jonakait, supra note 194, at 2117.
218
No databases exist that catalogue fingerprint patterns or the frequency of any
such patterns in any population groups. See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 18.
Without such databases, no statistical assessment can be made of the frequency with
which any particular series or collection of fingerprint patterns might appear randomly in the population. See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of
Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 609–13 (2002). DNA analysis,
by contrast, carefully assesses the frequency of particular alleles—or genetic variations—in various population subgroups. See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 20–26 (2000). With that data, scientists can calculate the chances of a random match to any particular DNA profile in a
given population group. Id. Without such data for fingerprints, analysts use their
subjective judgment to determine when a series of fingerprint patterns is unique and
rare enough to be deemed a match to the suspect, to the exclusion of all other persons. See Epstein, supra, at 612–14; Moriarty, supra note 199, at 13.
219
Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 26, 28.
220
See id. at 19–22, 24–25. Ironically, although DNA is the most scientific of the
forensic sciences, it is also the science that has been subjected to the most rigorous
legal challenge and judicial scrutiny. Yet, “[i]t was only when scientists from the
wider scientific community became acquainted with how DNA technology was being
applied forensically that doubts about the reliability of DNA evidence were brought
to the attention of the legal system.” Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific
Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1997). Those doubts and challenges
led to additional research, which ultimately improved the practice relating to and
acceptance of DNA evidence. Id. at 1049–50.
221
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S110.
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decision in 1993 and August 2, 1999. Risinger found that the defense
bar had failed to raise serious challenges to even the most dubious of
222
forensic evidence proffered by prosecutors. Risinger writes:
When I first started looking at these post-Daubert cases, I expected to find records of multiple well-litigated attacks on the
weakest kinds of common prosecution-proffered expertise, with
any system bias coming from judicial decisions. What I found was
an apparent systematic failure to seriously litigate these issues on
223
the part of the criminal defense bar.

The defense bar has simply not been up to the task of challenging
unreliable forensic science.
Risinger’s analysis also reveals that when admissibility is litigated,
defendants almost always lose, whether they are challenging stateproffered evidence or seeking to introduce their own expert testimony. Accordingly, as Neufeld has put it, “Lawyers are not the only
224
problem—judges have to share some responsibility.”
And, as Paul
Giannelli has shown, the Supreme Court has acquiesced in a series of
cases by failing “to impose the kind of ‘exacting’ standards in crimi225
nal prosecutions that are now required in civil litigation.”
Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that the pattern continues on appeal. Brandon Garrett’s analysis of the first 200 postconviction DNA exonerations, including 133 that produced written decisions, reveals that, while flawed forensic science evidence contributed
to the wrongful convictions in fifty-seven percent of the cases, challenges to such evidence were rare and successful challenges even
226
rarer. Of those 133 cases with written opinions, not a single one involved a direct constitutional challenge to the forensic evidence, only
thirty-two (twenty-four percent) brought any challenge of any type to
the evidence, and only fourteen (eleven percent) raised evidence-law

222
Similarly, Richard Underwood has observed that “many times lawyers default
on their professional obligation to challenge [scientific] evidence.” Richard H. Underwood, Evaluating Scientific and Forensic Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149, 152
(2000) (footnote omitted). “In too many cases,” he says, “the defense lawyer sits by
as silent as the proverbial potted palm.” Id. at 177; see Jonakait, supra note 195, at
168–69 (noting that, despite the availability of information indicating high error
rates in forensic science proficiency testing, defense lawyers have done little to detect
such errors).
223
Risinger, supra note 12, at 135.
224
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S110.
225
Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1076; see id. at 1083–96 (analyzing United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); and Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
226
See Garrett, supra note 23, at 76, 81.
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227

claims.
In those 133 appellate opinions, only a total of eight (six
percent) granted any type of relief based upon the challenge to the
228
forensic evidence. And these low numbers exist in a group of cases
in which we know, with the benefit of postconviction DNA testing,
that the inculpatory forensic evidence at trial was wrong.
In combination, inadequacies of the defense bar and inhospitability to defense forensic science have meant that some of the most
unreliable forensic evidence has been admitted without much analysis or discussion. Risinger notes, for example, that bite mark evidence is among the least reliable and most thinly validated of the fo229
rensic “sciences.”
Yet, in his analysis of state and federal cases, of
the forty-seven criminal cases that referenced bite mark evidence or
forensic odontology, only four or five involved any foundational challenge to the reliability of the evidence, and those few challenges were
brushed aside by citation to pre-Daubert cases without any real analy230
sis.
The situation is not much different for other forensic individualization evidence, such as handwriting identification. Handwriting
identification appeared in three hundred of the reported cases in Ris231
inger’s data set—120 in federal court and 180 in state court.
De232
spite the absence of much scientific foundation for such evidence,
Risinger found only one reported state case in which a challenge “was
made to the validity of any part of document examiner handwriting
identification practice,” and only nine reported Daubert challenges to
handwriting evidence in federal court—only two of which resulted in
restrictions on the scope of the handwriting identification testi233
mony.
Thus, Risinger concludes:
[T]he numbers seem to indicate that civil defendants have benefited greatly from Daubert, but that criminal defendants have not.
This seems especially true in regard to what might be called non-

227

See id. at 85.
See id.
229
Risinger, supra note 12, at 136–38. Risinger notes that forensic odontologists
have identified only a single validity study, and that 1975 study showed a seventy-six
percent error rate in identifications by experienced examiners who were tested. Id.
at 137 n.144.
230
Id. at 135–36.
231
Id. at 139.
232
See generally D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification: The Scientific Status of
Handwriting Identification Expertise, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 116,
at 734; see also Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 202, at 734.
233
Risinger, supra note 12, at 139–40.
228
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science forensic science, and it appears to be attributable partly to
the inertia of courts, but at least as much to the criminal defense
bar’s failure to construct sophisticated challenges and develop the
evidence to support them. Lest you doubt this conclusion, ask
yourself this question. If, after Daubert, substantial liability of
General Motors or Microsoft were dependent on the identification of bite marks found in various non-ideal media, and on their
attribution to various corporate employees, is it not clear that
these issues would have been litigated differently and more thoroughly than they have been, and that the results would have been
234
different?

Subsequent empirical analysis confirms Risinger’s findings. An
analysis of cases in the Westlaw database addressing admissibility of
expert testimony, in both the five and one-half years before Daubert
235
and the five and one-half years after Daubert,
confirmed that,
“[c]ontrary to the predictions of most commentators, the basic rates
of admission at the trial and the appellate court levels did not change
236
Moreover,
significantly after Daubert in criminal cases on appeal.”
at both the trial and appellate levels, prosecution experts were admitted far more frequently than defense experts: 95.8% of prosecution
experts were admitted at trial, compared to only 7.8% of defense experts; on appeal, 85.1% of prosecution experts were admitted, but
237
only 18.8% of defense experts were admitted.
One reason that traditional prosecution forensic science evidence has not been subjected to rigorous methodological review by
courts is, no doubt, as Risinger suggests, inertia or tradition. Such
evidence has been around for so long without much challenge that
seriously questioning or excluding it now seems almost unthinkable.
In this sense, forensic science evidence is to some degree similar to
psychological testimony, which has generally been admitted without
rigorous scrutiny. In a different but related context, Christopher
Slobogin has observed that “traditional psychological testimony is not
subject to judicial scrutiny because it is . . . traditional and, more persuasively, because juries are not likely to consider it objective or infal238
But admislible, but rather will naturally treat it with skepticism.”

234

Id. at 143.
Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002).
236
Id. at 345.
237
Id. at 346.
238
SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 28; see also Risinger, supra note 12, at 143 (noting
that one reason criminal defendants have not gotten much traction to their challenges to forensic expert evidence is “inertia of courts”).
235
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sion of forensic science evidence without rigorous scrutiny is more
problematic than lax review of psychological testimony because forensic sciences are precisely the type of scientific evidence that juries
are likely to consider objective and infallible. When a scientist from
the crime laboratory takes the stand to testify that fingerprints, or bite
marks, or hairs, or other such evidence from the crime scene can be
matched in the laboratory to the defendant, even—as such experts
sometimes claim—to the exclusion of all other persons in the world,
239
that testimony is likely to be accepted as conclusive.
Moreover, it can be difficult to challenge forensic evidence because, in some areas of expertise, most experts are current or former
240
state crime laboratory experts.
Where does one find a toolmark
examiner, fingerprint analyst, or bullet lead composition scientist?
The only place these “experts” exist—because the only place these
“sciences” exist—is in the government crime laboratories or spin-off
private laboratories whose roots are in the law enforcement community. As a general matter, therefore, the only experts in these fields
available to the defense are retired crime laboratory analysts, or aca241
Indeed, empirical
demic scientists in different but related fields.
evidence shows that, in appeals involving challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony, the appellant—the one challenging the admissibility of the evidence—was the defendant in seventy-six percent
of the cases, and in sixty-six percent of the cases, the appellant of242
fered no expert of her own at all.
In this sense, again, DNA is unique. DNA evidence has received
considerable and exacting judicial scrutiny—and its methods and
protocols have improved as a result—in part because DNA is one science in which there are experts outside the crime laboratories who
243
are available to defense lawyers. As Risinger has observed, “because
DNA is academic science, the defense attorney had experts available
239

“As one juror put it after a recent trial in Queens, N.Y., ‘You can’t argue with
science.’” Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 46. “[T]he esoteric nature of an
expert’s opinions, together with the jargon and the expert’s scholarly credentials,
may cast an aura of infallibility over his or her testimony.” Id. at 48.
240
See, e.g., Saks, supra note 184, at 240 (The forensic identification sciences “have
little or no existence outside the courts. They have few academic and no commercial
counterparts . . . .”).
241
See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 170 (Defendants have a “fundamental problem”
in locating qualified experts, in part because “the experts are either employees or
former employees of law enforcement agencies.”) (quoting Edward Imwinkelried,
Observations on Access to Expertise, 101 F.R.D. 639, 640 (1983), and MICHAEL SAKS & R.
VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 26 (1983)).
242
Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 344–45.
243
See Risinger, supra note 12, at 125–27.
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from the academic community who could provide virtual turn-key tes244
The same simply is not
timony on relevant points of weakness.”
true of most of the individualization forensic sciences.
Part of the problem, when it comes to forensic sciences, is that
there is little or no research to draw on; in most disciplines, no one
has done the research to either validate or undermine the individu245
When Daubert challenges have been brought,
alization sciences.
one consequence has been that in some cases, such as for handwrit246
ing analysis, the challenges have prompted research.
As discussed
below, in other instances where an outside organization has done the
research, the research has sometimes revealed that the “science” is
247
not scientific, and has led to its discontinuation. Currently, there is
little incentive to do the research. These “sciences” are outside mainstream academic areas, police have little incentive to do the research
because the evidence is already routinely admitted and accepted, and
defendants have neither the resources nor the sophistication or inclination to undertake the research. As the forensic sciences have
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, this is beginning to
change, but far more work is still needed.

244
Id. at 127 (footnote omitted). Even with DNA, however, finding defense experts was very difficult initially. When DNA first emerged as a forensic tool in the
late 1980s, defense counsel initially reported an inability to locate any molecular biologists willing to testify and critique the forensic applications of DNA typing. Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 52.
245
See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1108 (“[B]asic scientific research is needed.
Many forensic techniques gained judicial acceptance before demanding standards
were required.”); Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tire, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12, 40 (2000) (“All
the areas of forensic science discussed in this article share two common denominators: In each area little rigorous, systematic research has been done to validate the
discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in each area there is no evident reason why such research would be infeasible.”); Jonakait, supra note 195, at 131–32, 137
(noting that neither universities nor the crime laboratories do much research on the
forensic sciences). Michael Saks notes that Daubert has been important because it has
demanded some research to support the forensic individualization sciences: “[F]rom
many fields the courts will receive nothing better than what they required. Many
fields, perhaps most notably the forensic identification sciences, will do whatever it
takes to satisfy the courts and little more.” Saks, supra note 184, at 240.
246
See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1098, 1098 nn.156–57 (citing Moshe Kam et
al., Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778
(1997); Moshe Kam et al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of NonProfessionals in Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998);
Sargur Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 (2002)).
247
See infra notes 361–95 and accompanying text.
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B. Institutional Impediments to Proper Adversary Adjudication
of Forensic Science Issues
Given these circumstances, the adversary adjudicatory process
cannot work well in criminal cases to ensure the reliability of forensic
science evidence. Some contend that the adversary process by design
is not well-suited to seeking the truth on such matters. Under the adversary process, “party control dictates that the sole source of the
truth comes from evidence offered by the parties through their at248
torneys.” Yet, the argument goes, the objective of the parties is not
to present or seek the truth; rather, “the objective in an adversarial
249
trial is victory.”
If the truth is incompatible with the adversary goal
of winning, “then the attorney must do all she can—within decidedly
250
vague ethical constraints—to hide or distort the truth.” In criminal
cases, when it comes to expert evidence, the problem is even more
profound; the problem is not just that the parties are not properly
motivated, but that, as we have seen, the defense is ill-equipped to obtain, present, or challenge forensic science evidence.
251
252
In addition, judges (and juries) lack the training and resources to assess forensic science evidence; they don’t adequately un253
derstand science or the scientific process.
The Daubert regime requires judges to evaluate science in a way they never had to before—
on scientific terms. But judges generally are not equipped to do that.
Thus, while Daubert promises to improve the scrutiny of scientific evi-

248

Strier, supra note 13, at 103.
Id. at 101.
250
Id. at 104.
251
See Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 340–41, 367 (noting research indicating
that judges “lack understanding of [the Daubert reliability criteria] and of scientific
reliability in general”).
252
“Given their lack of scientific sophistication and innumeracy, jurors are likely
to overestimate the significance of [expert testimony].” Underwood, supra note 222,
at 166. Commentators have observed that juries, ill-equipped to evaluate scientific
claims, default to “either deferential acceptance when only one expert testifies, or
selection between the experts as attractive persons and apparently authoritative figures when two experts oppose each other.” Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56, at
29.
253
Indeed, the very enterprises of law, as applied by judges and juries, and science
are quite different. “The relationship between science and law has been described as
a marriage of opposites, as a conflict between rival systems, and as a clash of cultures.” Redmayne, supra note 220, at 1035 (footnotes omitted). For example, scientific knowledge is always contingent, evolving, and disputable. But the legal world
demands final resolution, even when disputes resolve around unsettled scientific
propositions. As Redmayne puts it, “[w]e expect scientists to give us answers before
all the evidence is in.” Id. at 1031. In the legal world, “[j]ustice and finality take
precedence over truth, but science progresses.” Id. at 1042.
249
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dence and end the deference to the scientists who are proponents or
practitioners of their own particular theory or method, Daubert creates a new set of problems by shifting the decisionmaking about the
sciences from scientists to ill-equipped judges. Michael Saks observes:
The major paradox of judicial gatekeeping of “scientific, technical, or other specialized” expert knowledge is that those to whom
the law assigns the responsibility for screening such evidentiary offerings have no particular expertise for conducting those evaluations. Our legal system provides judges with few tools to help
them evaluate the assertions of experts. 254

Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his Daubert concurrence, expressed concern that judges do not understand scientific principles
such as “falsifiability,” and voiced discomfort with the notion that
255
Daubert would turn judges into “amateur scientists.”
A recent example of the challenges facing judges when confronted with scientific evidence can be found in Justice Breyer’s reaction to the parties’ competing claims about the humaneness of the
three-drug protocol used for lethal injections, and the competing
claim that a different combination or a one-drug protocol would be
more humane. In Baze v. Rees, the Court recently affirmed a decision
of the Supreme Court of Kentucky that the three-drug cocktail does
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
256
At oral argument, Justice Breyer noted that
unusual punishment.
he had read the scientific articles challenging the three-drug protocol
that were cited in the briefs filed by the inmates, but that he found
them confusing. “So I’m left at sea,” he said. “I understand your
contention. You claim that this is somehow more painful than some
other method. But which? And what’s the evidence for that? What
257
do I read to find it?”

254

Saks, supra note 184, at 230 (footnote omitted).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993).
256
128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
257
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Chilly to Bid to Alter Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2008. In his concurring opinion in Baze, Justice Breyer again noted the conflicting
scientific reports about the three-drug cocktail, but ultimately relied upon default
litigation rules, rather than science, to uphold current practice:
I believe that the legal merits of the kind of claim presented must inevitably turn . . . upon facts and evidence. And I cannot find, either in the
record in this case or in the literature on the subject, sufficient evidence
that Kentucky’s execution method poses the ‘significant and unnecessary
risk of inflicting severe pain’ that petitioners assert.
128 S. Ct. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion similarly cited the debate in the medical literature, and noted that the Court is not institutionally capable of resolving that dispute:
255
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Similar concerns were expressed recently by a trial judge confronted with testimony from competing experts about mitochondrial
canine DNA. Expressing a need for help in the way of “accreditation
and documentation of scientific procedures,” he said:
I had a case recently that involved mitochondrial DNA, and I
had one expert that told me the database was good, and the other
expert told me the database was no good.
And I had a statistics guy who came from Mongolia who I
couldn’t understand, and basically, Wisconsin doesn’t have the
Daubert rule, so it was real easy for me. I just said, no, this goes to
the jury, the jury can sort it out. But it left me with a distinct fear
that I was at some point going to have a jury that decided, well, it’s
DNA, it’s good, and then I had to decide whether or not it met
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt and throw the case
out after the jury found the guy guilty.
Luckily for me, the prosecutor threw the case out before he
went to trial, which I think was a good decision. But the idea of
not having a basis for me without trying to find on my own behalf
an expert who I felt was, could give me the ultimate answer on
this database issue and incurring the county’s expense to do that
beyond what they’ve already incurred left me in the dark, basically, and . . . having some kind of a standard or protocol in that
258
situation would have been of assistance.

He then elaborated:
The issue was the efficacy of this database, which was a dog database that was part of the one that everybody submits things to.
There’s no control about things going into it . . . and both these
people came from accredited labs.
One guy was from Michigan State, and although he wasn’t forensically accredited, he was accredited through some university
program, and the other one was a veterinarian down in Texas
who had an accredited DNA lab. And the issue really was whether
or not this database that the Michigan State guy was using was an
effective database for the purpose of forensic science.
And it made a tremendous amount of difference, because if
you used the database that she wanted you to use, the numbers of
dogs that matched the circumstance multiplied dramatically over
We do not purport to take sides in this dispute. We cite it only to confirm that a ‘best practices’ approach, calling for the weighing of relative
risks without some measure of deference to a State’s choice of execution
procedures would involve the courts in debatable matters far exceeding
their expertise.
Id. at 1532 n.2.
258
Transcript of Proceedings of the Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission, Nov. 27, 2007, at 21.
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the number of dogs that matched the circumstance using the information used. And I didn’t feel that I had really a basis to determine it based on what each of them were telling me, which was
259
whether that database was actually an effective database or not.

Indeed, research confirms that judges and juries do not understand science or the scientific principles required for evaluating the
260
validity of scientific studies.
A survey of four hundred state court
judges published in 2001 revealed that “[o]nly six percent of respondents demonstrated a good understanding of the concept of ‘falsifiability,’ and just four percent had a clear understanding of error
261
rate.”
Judges in one study “were no more likely to admit a valid
study than they were to admit a study that lacked a control group,
contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter
262
bias.” Yet judges tend not to realize their lack of understanding. In
a three-state survey, nearly eighty percent of judges asserted that ex263
pert testimony was rarely too technical for them to understand. As
Janet Hoeffel has put it, because judges are ill-equipped to evaluate
scientific evidence, “[t]he shift of responsibility from the scientific
264
community to the judiciary has simply been too much to bear.”
Similarly, research indicates that jurors often do not understand
the fundamentals of scientific evidence, and lack the “ability to reason about statistical, probabilistic, and methodological issues effec265
tively.” Various studies have shown that lay people are insensitive to
259

Id. at 22–23.
David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 817 (1977) (noting that judges are, for the most part, technically illiterate);
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1320 (“there is little reason to believe that judges are specially equipped” to evaluate scientific evidence); Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. Meyer,
Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 319, 326
(1999) (noting that most litigators and judges admit that they lack a solid foundation
in science); Jeffrey N. Martin, Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of
Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 473 (1979)
(“Most judges and most commentators acknowledge the incompetence of judges to
decide matters of scientific uncertainty.”); Bradley D. McAuliff et al., Juror DecisionMaking in the 21st Century: Confronting Science and Technology in Court, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS (D. Carson & R. Bull eds., 2d ed., 2003); Saks, supra
note 184, at 230 (noting that judges have no expertise to assess scientific evidence
under Daubert).
261
Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: Progress
Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 643 (2007) (citing Sophia I. Gatowski et al.,
Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a PostDaubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001)).
262
McAuliff et al., supra note 260, at 305.
263
Id.
264
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1324.
265
McAuliff et al., supra note 260, at 305.
260
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sample bias; fail to recognize the unreliability of tests involving small
samples; demonstrate considerable variability in their statistical reasoning skills; have failed to note the significance of missing comparative or control group information; underutilize expert probabilistic
testimony compared to Bayesian norms; have difficulty understand266
ing statistical evidence; and underutilize statistical evidence.
In the end, because judges and juries are not experts, scientific
decisions, including decisions about admissibility, tend to be made
based on assessments of the personality, credentials, and perceived
credibility of the experts, more than on the validity of scientific research: “An advantage lies with the party whose expert has the most
persuasive forensic skills rather than the most authoritative and meri267
And because prosecution experts tend to be
torious testimony.”
government employees, imbued with the authority and apparent objectivity of their position, while defense experts tend to look like
268
hired guns, the result has been that most prosecution experts are
admitted, but defense experts are not, regardless of the scientific
269
merits of their evidence.
In sum, under these conditions, the adversary case-by-case
method, dependent on individual prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and juries and their ability to understand and marshal the
requisite expertise in case after case, especially given the system’s
270
many imbalances, is not a good way to address forensic sciences.
The risk of error in individual cases is high.
266

Id.
Strier, supra note 13, at 133; see Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2008) (describing how judges decide scientific questions based on “the norms of
persuasion within the courtroom: witness credibility including factors such as demeanor, assessment of bias, completeness of explanation, and certainty of opinion,”
leading to decisions that can go “against the body of generally accepted scientific
evidence”).
268
Slobogin, supra note 126, at 117. “[A]ny one attorney’s attempt to obtain research for a particular case is likely to meet a hostile reception from the courts, because it is so obviously motivated by litigation needs.” Id.
269
Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 344–45; Joëlle Anne Moreno, What Happens
When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3
(2004); Risinger, supra note 12, at 105–08.
270
Some contend that, even operating optimally, the adversary process is not a
reliable way to address complex scientific issues.
But the most basic problem is that adversarial procedure assigns sole
responsibility for conducting the inquiry to the functionaries who may
be least interested in exposing the relevant scientific evidence. The attorney will want to omit and distort any evidence not presenting his client’s case in the best possible light. When expert witnesses are pushed
into advocacy roles, attorneys corrupt the value of their expertise.
267
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Another consequence of leaving admissibility questions to the
adversary adjudicative process is that stare decisis can quickly become a
substitute for analysis, and can freeze judgments about science even if
the science itself continues to evolve. To the extent that stare decisis
minimizes the need for repeated, case-by-case determination, it can
do so in the wrong way—by locking in misjudgments about science,
and preventing fluid adaptation of admissibility or other legal stan271
dards to reflect changing scientific knowledge.
Michael Risinger,
for example, has traced the history of bite-mark evidence, showing
how admissibility was initially based on one case manifesting exceptional circumstances establishing reliability that was subsequently
272
cited and spread without re-analysis to become accepted doctrine.
Conversely, when stare decisis does not control, another effect of
the Daubert doctrine is that, by taking the review of scientific evidence
from the scientific community and giving it to trial judges, the lower
courts “are deciding the same issues differently. A particular expertise or scientific method may be admitted in one court and denied in
another. The effect is a patchwork of admissibility in many areas of
273
Judges’ lack of training and experience necessary for
expertise.”
evaluating scientific opinions means that “their comprehension and
274
handling of scientific issues is intrinsically not predictable.”
All of this suggests that the adversary system, at least as presently
constituted, cannot cope with forensic science evidence in criminal
cases. To work effectively, the adversary process needs assistance. As
Peter Neufeld has put it, “[i]f the courts cannot be relied upon for
this protection [against unreliable forensic science], other remedies
must be found further ‘upstream’ so that the disreputable evidence is
275
never proffered.”

Strier, supra note 13, at 114.
271
Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 46–47 (noting the ways in which deference to prior
judicial opinions has been substituted for serious reliability analysis for numerous
forensic sciences).
272
Risinger, supra note 12, at 135–39.
273
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1324.
274
Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 326.
275
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S111.

FINDLEY_FINAL_V2

2008]

6/12/2008 11:27:07 AM

INNOCENTS AT RISK

951

IV. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
A. First Steps
1.

Limiting the Scope of Forensic Evidence

A number of suggestions have been made to address these problems, including encouraging courts to limit the admissibility of expert
testimony by disallowing unsupported conclusions that crime scene
276
Similarly,
evidence and evidence from the defendant “match.”
rules might disallow “overpowering or misleading testimony,” such as
testimony that identified fingerprints had to have come from the de277
fendant to the exclusion of everyone else in the world. Jury instructions might also be used to help juries put shaky but admissible ex278
pert forensic evidence into proper context.
2.

Regulating Crime Laboratories

Others have suggested regulation through accreditation and cer279
tification of crime laboratories and analysts.
The federal government regulates all medical clinical laboratories under the Clinical
280
Laboratory Improvements Act of 1988, and the empirical evidence
shows considerable quality improvement when laboratories are regu281
lated.
Noting that clinical laboratories that serve the medical profession are subject to such regulation, including mandatory accreditation and proficiency testing, but that crime laboratories are not, Peter
Neufeld and Neville Colman observe that “there is more regulation of
clinical laboratories that determine whether one has mononucleosis
than there is of forensic laboratories able to produce DNA test results
282
that can help send a person to the electric chair.”
Among a growing chorus of scholars who now argue for mandatory regulation of crime laboratories, Paul Giannelli points out that,
in developing a regulatory scheme, “there is no need to start from
276
Under this suggestion, because the data does not exist to permit any meaningful understanding of what a “match” means, one solution could be “to allow the examiner to discuss the points of comparison but to disallow the examiner from declaring a match or asserting conclusions.” Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 29.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 31.
279
See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 208–20; Jonakait, supra note 195, at 172–91
(citing the Clincal Laboratories Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1983)).
280
Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a
(2007)).
281
Jonakait, supra note 195, at 173; see also Giannelli, supra note 203, at 211.
282
Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 53.
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scratch,” because “DNA labs are presently regulated and can serve as
283
In 1988, the FBI estaba model for all crime laboratory units.”
lished the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods
(TWGDAM), which was later renamed the Scientific Working Group
on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), with responsibility for devel284
Thereafter,
oping quality control standards for DNA laboratories.
in 1994, Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act, which created
the Combined Offender DNA Index System (CODIS), the national
285
databank of DNA profiles of convicted offenders. At the same time,
Congress created a DNA Advisory Board (DAB) to promulgate quality
assurance standards, and required proficiency testing of examiners
286
Finally, as a part of the Justice for All Act of
and external audits.
2004, Congress mandated accreditation of all DNA labs as a require287
ment for eligibility to contribute to or access CODIS.
As Giannelli
therefore observes: “Thus, the paradox: the most scientifically sound
procedure—DNA analysis—is the most extensively regulated, while
many forensic techniques with questionable scientific pedigrees are
288
Similar regulation of all crime laboratocompletely unregulated.”
ries would go a long way toward compensating for the inadequacies
of the adversary criminal justice system alone to ensure good quality
forensic science.
In recent years, a number of states have experimented with creating forensic science oversight boards, or forensic science commis289
290
291
292
sions.
New York, Texas, and Oklahoma now mandate accreditation of their crime laboratories. Instead of creating a separate
board and accreditation process for crime laboratories, Maryland has
283

Giannelli, supra note 203, at 208–09.
Id. at 209.
285
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
14131–14134 (West 2005)).
286
See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 171–72.
287
42 U.S.C.A. § 14132.
288
Giannelli, supra note 203, at 210.
289
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2007) (establishing forensic laboratory advisory board); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995a-b (McKinney 2003) (establishing forensic science
commission and requiring accreditation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West
2007) (requiring accreditation); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35(d) (Vernon
2005) (requiring accreditation by Texas Department of Public Safety); VA. CODE
ANN. § 9.1-1101 (2006) (creating separate Department of Forensic Science and oversight committee). The federal government has also encouraged reform. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 3797k(4) (West 2007) (requiring that DNA laboratories receiving federal
grants create mechanisms for external independent investigations).
290
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b (McKinney 2003).
291
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon 2005).
292
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West 2004).
284
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recently made crime laboratories subject to the same regulation as
clinical laboratories under the Maryland Department of Health and
293
But such experiments remain the exception, not
Mental Hygiene.
the norm.
Nationwide, voluntary accreditation and some proficiency testing is now offered by the crime laboratories themselves, through the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accredi294
tation Board (ASCLD/LAB). But accreditation is not uniform, and
doubts have been raised about the sufficiency of such voluntary selfregulation: “Where labs are certified, there are still concerns about
295
Moreover, voluntary selfhow meaningful that process may be.”
regulation does not ensure that all forensic science service-providers
296
are accredited.
And while many of the individual disciplines have
created certification boards in various forensic specialties like criminalistics, questioned documents, toxicology, physical anthropology,
and psychiatry, “most forensic practitioners do not complete the
somewhat costly process for certification because the profession does
not mandate it to practice, and crime laboratories, the police, and
297
Short of
the courts do not require it to examine case evidence.”
full-blown regulation, other commentators have urged certification
programs that, at a minimum, require labs to participate in blind pro298
ficiency testing.
While mandatory regulation—complete with lab accreditation,
analyst certification, mandatory quality assurance standards (including proficiency testing, laboratory audits, and corrective action procedures), and standardized technical procedures—would go far toward protecting the criminal justice system against misleading or

293
Brian Witte, Md. Puts Teeth in Bill to Regulate Crime Labs, WTOPNEWS.COM, May
7, 2007, http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=25&sid=1134411.
294
Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: Progress
Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 632 (2007).
295
Moriarty, supra note 199, at 8.
296
After evaluating the science and methods of DNA testing in 1992, the National
Academy of Sciences issued a report noting, in part, that
[v]oluntary accreditation programs are not enough. Because professional organizations, such as ASCLD-LAB, lack regulatory authority, forensic laboratories could avoid accreditation and still offer DNA typing
evidence in criminal proceedings. In view of the important public-policy
goal that this powerful technology be practiced only at the highest standard, compliance with high standards must be mandatory.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 106 (1992)
[hereinafter NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY].
297
Peterson & Leggett, supra note 294, at 632.
298
See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 182–90.
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flawed forensic science, adversary imbalance and institutional incompetence will still make it difficult for the criminal justice system to
299
cope well with increasingly complicated scientific evidence.
3.

Independent Court-Appointed Experts

Other commentators have noted that courts can and should take
more advantage of their authority to appoint their own independent
300
experts. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, courts have such authority. Science panels appointed by courts have been used to assist
301
in complex tort cases, such as the silicone breast implant litigation.
Justice Breyer, concurring in Joiner, recommended that judges make
greater use of their authority to appoint experts, and to look to estab302
lished scientific organizations for guidance.
While such independent experts can be helpful, they cannot be
the whole solution. The system almost certainly cannot afford the
burden and expense of appointing independent experts in each case
303
Nor can even an independinvolving a serious scientific dispute.
ently appointed expert be assured to get the science right, in part because there often is no one right answer in science. The notion that
an independent expert can find objective scientific truth ignores that
science itself is socially constructed, and therefore cannot be deter304
mined definitively or by analysis of even a well-selected expert.
As
some critics have suggested, court-appointed independent experts
“will eliminate the diversity of scientific opinions, but hearing only
305
one side does not make testimony more reliable.”
299

See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 211–20.
Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 30; Peterson & Leggett, supra note 294, at
643–44 (“Neutral experts clearly can assist the courts in evaluating the testimony of
partisan experts by focusing on the scientific reasoning and methodology used by the
experts and helping the court to determine if the experts’ conclusions and opinions
are based on scientifically reliable data.”).
301
Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 30 (citing Norris v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 881–82 (10th Cir. 2005)); see Moreno, supra note 188, at 1089.
302
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
303
See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
304
See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32
JURIMETRICS 345, 347 (1992) (“[T]he ‘facts’ that scientists present to the rest of the
world are not direct reflections of nature; rather, these ‘facts’ are produced by human agency through the institutions and processes of science, and hence they invariably contain a social component.”); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 12–14 (1990).
305
Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 328 (footnotes omitted); see Joe S. Cecil &
Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525 (1994); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6
300

FINDLEY_FINAL_V2

2008]

6/12/2008 11:27:07 AM

INNOCENTS AT RISK

955

Moreover, as Sheila Jasanoff has explained, “scientific claims are
intrinsically provisional, contingent, and subject to deconstruction
under critical scrutiny. Scientific claims, in short, are inherently
306
open-ended.”
Accordingly, while independent court-appointed
experts might help judges in individual cases understand the science,
and help them capture “a still frame out of the continually unfurling
307
motion picture of science,” as is required in litigation, something
more enduring, more receptive to the evolving and socially negotiated nature of science is required to help the adversary adjudicative
process cope with forensic science over the long haul.
B. A More Comprehensive Approach: A Forensic Science
Oversight Commission
1.

The Scientific Oversight Model

More institutionalized oversight of forensic sciences, by scientists, is needed to compensate for the inadequacies of adversary adjudication. In other arenas, where science and policy intersect, we have
created expert institutions to mediate important disputes. Where
public health and safety are at stake, for example, we rely on the expertise of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to analyze the
science and make determinations to protect us from untested or un308
We also rely on institutions such as the National Instisafe drugs.
tutes of Health (NIH) to foster medical research to improve public
309
health.
Although the stakes are also high with forensic sciences—
in terms of individual well-being and public safety—we have no similar expert institutions to protect us from bad forensic science. Peter
Neufeld, among others, has therefore called for creating a national
forensic science institute to validate technologies and methodologies
310
and set standards for interpretation of data.
Such a commission
might be an example of the kind of “inter-cultural ‘bridging’ instituYALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480 (1988); Carl Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral
Expert: A View from the Trenches, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 36 (1997).
306
Jasanoff, supra note 304, at 356.
307
Id.
308
For more than a century, since the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the FDA
and its predecessors have been responsible for regulating food and drugs in the
United States. See generally Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting the Public Health from
Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to OffLabel Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117 (2007); John P.
Swann, History of the FDA, http:www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm.
309
See generally National Institutes of Health, Overview, http://www.nih.gov/about
/NIHoverview.html; About NIH, www.nih.gov/about/index.html#mission.
310
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S113.
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tions,” which Peter Schuck has proposed, that rely on experts, institutions, and decision-making rules of science to control core scientific
questions, thereby enabling “the relevant scientific, legal, and politi311
cal values [to] be integrated with greater synergy and less waste.”
Like the FDA, such an institute or commission should be a permanent, standing body charged with responsibility for overseeing the
field of forensic sciences. Such an institute could independently
evaluate and validate (or invalidate) the sciences, establish recommendations for admissibility, recommend or establish protocols, recommend cautionary instructions, create incentives for research and
312
validation, provide funding for such research, and oversee accreditation and blind proficiency testing. And such a standing institute
could revisit scientific questions as scientific knowledge evolves, to
continually improve practice and our understanding of the significance of various kinds of scientific evidence. It might impose mandatory protocols and practices, but it need not finally determine questions of admissibility.
Instead, the information and quality
improvements it would produce could be utilized in litigation to enhance the courts’ ability to make admissibility determinations and
other such judgments that are more appropriately vested in legal decision-makers.
Such a plan would be consistent with the trend toward, and the
need for, more reliance on administrative solutions to compensate
for adversarial inadequacies. As Darryl Brown has explained,
[T]he strategy of pursuing accuracy through adversarial processes—through well-equipped defense counsel in particular—has
reached a political limit. Broadly speaking, legislatures are interested in accurate criminal adjudication, but they do not view zealous defense attorneys as the best way to achieve that goal. Accordingly, adversarial process will not be a politically sustainable
means for assuring the accuracy of fact-gathering. Partisan challenges brought by defense counsel against the state’s evidence
must become—and are becoming—less dominant tools for serv311

Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (1993). Schuck, for example, argues that “core scientific issue[s] like
causation should be authoritatively decided within the scientific culture by institutions that this culture designates as appropriate to the task . . . . In the Bendectin
cases and many others like it, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is that institution.” Id. at 38–39.
312
As noted, currently there is very limited money in research of forensic disciplines. Unlike civil matters in which pharmaceutical companies, asbestos manufacturers, and other industry players have financial incentives to fund research, the parties to a criminal matter have neither the incentive nor the resources to fund the
basic research that is needed.
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ing a renewed popular commitment to accuracy. Other actors
and institutions, with different mixes of motives and weaknesses,
are equipped to take on—and are starting to take on—more of
313
that task.

Such an institute or commission, by relying more on scientists to
oversee forensic science, would in the end level the playing field and
thereby enhance the adversary system’s capacity for finding the truth
on questions related to such sciences.
Although such a national institute does not presently exist, there
are examples of such scientific oversight of forensic science questions
that show how such an institute might work. This would not be a sci314
ence court. Nor would such an institution replace the judicial role
in making ultimate admissibility decisions, or judgments about guilt
or innocence based upon scientific evidence. Nor is this suggestion
meant to embrace a naively positivist view of science by assuming that
scientific questions can be resolved objectively and definitively by experts. Rather, this proposal envisions an expert agency with the capacity and charge to generate the research and conduct the independent analyses needed to help forensic scientists improve their
practices, and to help courts evaluate a wide range of forensic science
issues by providing the information they need to perform their
Daubert gatekeeping role. In short, we need to do for the rest of fo315
rensic science what we have done for DNA.
a.

An Example: The Maguire Seven

Examples of such oversight, in isolated areas, abound. In the
1990s, Great Britain turned to an expert panel of scientists to resolve
disputed scientific evidence in several notorious cases involving convictions related to the IRA bombing campaign of the mid-1970s. In
313

Brown, supra note 24, at 1645.
A science court was proposed in 1976 by a White House Task Force as a means
to use adversary adjudicatory processes to resolve scientific disputes that had important public policy implications. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 185, at 54. Science
courts were to be presided over by scientist-judges, who would receive testimony from
scientific experts under cross-examination by science advocates. Id.; see James A.
Martin, The Proposed “Science Court”, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); Jeffrey N. Martin,
Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science
Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443 (1979); Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, SCIENCE, May 12, 1967, at 763; Arthur Kantrowitz, The
Science Court Experiment: Criticisms and Responses, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
April 1977, at 44. Such efforts “have failed because the scientific problem-solving
methodology favors professional competence and authority rather than due process,
and professional and trade organizations are mired by conflicts of interest that favor
politics over scientific facts.” Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 328.
315
See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
314
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1976, members of the Maguire family were convicted of explosives offenses almost entirely on the basis of forensic scientific evidence indicating that swabs taken from the defendants’ hands revealed traces of
316
nitroglycerine. At trial, the defense called an expert who criticized
317
In the
the prosecution’s scientific evidence on various grounds.
early 1990s, an in-depth judicial inquiry conducted by Sir John May
vindicated the defense expert’s criticisms, and ultimately led the
318
Court of Appeal to quash the convictions. As part of Sir John May’s
judicial inquiry, he set up a scientific committee to attempt to settle
the scientific disputes. While the committee could not agree on all
conclusions, the committee identified enough deficiencies in the
319
As Mike
original scientific evidence to undermine the convictions.
Redmayne has observed, when confronted with such unsettled scientific propositions as those at issue in the Maguire cases, “[a] scientific
inquiry, like that eventually instigated by Sir John May, would have
been the obvious scientific way to deal with unease about the evi320
dence.”
b.

An Example: The Eyewitness Identification
Blue-Ribbon Panel

Experts in a forensic science oversight institution need not be
specialists or practitioners in a particular field—indeed, in many instances they ought not be, in order to give them the objectivity
needed to evaluate the forensic identification method at issue.
Rather, they might be experts in fields related to the forensic identification method, or most importantly, they must be scientists who
understand the scientific method and hence are capable of evaluating the scientific validity of the technique or process at issue.
One example is provided by the recent work of a panel of scientists that was convened to examine one issue related to eyewitness
identification methods. Eyewitness identification is one area that has
drawn significant social science research, but also recently some controversy about that research, culminating in competing studies that
had conflicting results on at least one issue. As explained below, a
blue ribbon panel of scientists was able to review the competing studies and come to conclusions on their relative authority.

316
317
318
319
320

Redmayne, supra note 220, at 1039.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1040, 1043.
Id. at 1041, 1043–44.
Id. at 1043.
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For many years, academic researchers, primarily research psychologists, have studied human memory and perception, and in particular the ability of human beings to recognize and identify faces of
321
strangers. That research has produced numerous insights and published recommendations about the ways in which police ought to reform the eyewitness identification procedures to minimize the risks of
322
While the bulk of that literature is published in
misidentification.
scholarly journals, some of the conclusions and recommendations
have also been adopted by policy and procedure guides published by
government technical advisory groups, state attorneys general offices,
323
and local law enforcement offices. A few courts have also begun to
take note and have incorporated this research into new legal standards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence, the
admissibility of eyewitness experts, and jury instructions on a variety
324
of identification-related matters. Finally, legislatures have begun to
pay attention as well; a few have adopted legislation recognizing or

321
The first psychological research into eyewitness identification issues began 100
years ago, and was conducted by Hugo Munsterberg. See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON
THE WITNESS STAND (1908). Munsterberg was ahead of his time, however, as the legal
system refused to consider his research. JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS,
COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION 9–34 (2005) (describing Munsterberg’s battle with Dean John Henry Wigmore for judicial recognition of
the psychological principles underlying eyewitness error). Research into eyewitness
identification accelerated in the 1970s with the work of such pioneers as Elizabeth
Loftus and Gary Wells, who, joined by many other researchers, have produced an
enormous volume of research literature since then.
322
See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 103.
323
See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; BUREAU OF TRAINING AND STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 3 (2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/Eyewitness
Public.pdf; Gina Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witnesses To
Say, “It’s Him”, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1.
324
See United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he science
of eyewitness perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology, and reliability of any psychological research.”) (internal quotations omitted); United States
v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380,
1401 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986);
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265, 278 (Cal. 2000); State v. Dubray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont.
2003) (relying upon “the scholarship on the subject of eyewitness testimony over the
last decade”); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005).

FINDLEY_FINAL_V2

960

6/12/2008 11:27:07 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:893

incorporating some of these recommendations based on this scien325
tific research.
Eyewitness identification reform has met significant resistance
from many prosecutors and police, however, who have criticized the
research because it is largely laboratory research that they complain is
inapplicable in the real world. They question whether laboratory
studies—often utilizing mock crimes and college student witnesses—
accurately capture the experience of real witnesses who witness real
crimes. Two of the more significant of the recommendations have
been particularly controversial among law enforcement—“doubleblind” administration of identification procedures, and sequential
rather than traditional simultaneous presentation of suspects and fillers in a lineup or photo array. Under the double blind procedure
the police officer administering the identification procedure must be
one who does not know who the suspect was so that she cannot even
unintentionally cue the witness or shade interpretation of the witness’s responses. The sequential presentation of suspects and fillers
(showing individuals one at a time rather than simultaneously) is designed to encourage witnesses to make absolute memory-based judgments about each individual rather than relative, “looks-most-like”
judgments by comparing each displayed individual to the others. In
the laboratory, these and other procedures significantly reduce the
rate of eyewitness error, and improve the ratio of correct identifications to mistakes.
Noting that most of the research on these matters has been
326
laboratory research, the Illinois legislature directed three Illinois
police departments to undertake a field study to examine the effec327
That project,
tiveness of the double-blind sequential procedures.
involving the Police Departments in Chicago, Evanston, and Joliet
under the direction of Sheri Mecklenberg, general counsel for the
Chicago Police, produced results ostensibly contradicting the labora325

See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2008) (requiring North Carolina
law enforcement to employ a range of research-based reforms, including doubleblind sequential procedures and proper witness instructions); WIS. STAT. § 175.50
(2007) (requiring every law enforcement agency in the state to adopt written policies
governing eyewitness identification procedures, and to consider employing doubleblind sequential procedures).
326
One field study in Hennepin County, Minnesota, had been conducted, which
produced results consistent with those predicted by the laboratory studies, but it did
not compare the double-blind sequential procedure to traditional non-blind simultaneous procedures. Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
381 (2006).
327
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-10 (2008).
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tory research, and purporting to indicate that the traditional, nonblind simultaneous procedure produced more accurate identifications of suspects and fewer mistaken identifications of innocent fillers
328
than did the double-blind sequential procedure.
The Mecklenberg Report, named after its principal author,
Sheri Mecklenberg, stirred up considerable controversy. Police and
prosecutors resistant to reform championed it as proof that their
329
Reformers and many eyewitness
tried and true methods were best.
researchers, however, were appalled at methodological problems in
the Report that they contended undermined its ability to say anything
330
The field research, they claimed, was marred by conof value.
founds that obscured any ability to interpret the data.
For example, while the double-blind sequential procedure in the
study was carefully controlled to ensure that every identification procedure followed the same protocol, the non-blind simultaneous procedures were not; police in various locations were permitted to continue doing whatever it was they had been doing all along. The result
was that it was difficult to tell what police were doing in the non-blind
simultaneous procedures that got witnesses to pick suspects with
greater frequency. Moreover, the Mecklenberg Report used suspect
picks as a proxy for accurate picks. But of course, in a field study, one
cannot know if suspects are in fact true perpetrators; the study assumed that which the identification procedures were designed to test.
Perhaps most importantly, the Mecklenberg Report failed to
control for multiple variables. By at once testing both the double-

328
SHERI H. MECKLENBERG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:
THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/IL%20Pilot%20on%
20Eyewitness%20ID.pdf.
329
See, e.g., MASS. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE JUSTICE
INITIATIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CASES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2006), http://www.mass.gov/Dmdaa/docs/justice_ini
ative_report/justice_initiative_report.pdf.
330
See NANCY STEBLAY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ILLINOIS FIELD STUDY DATA, available
at http://web.augsburg.edu/~steblay/ObservationsOnTheIllinoisData.pdf (last visited March 6, 2008); Timothy P. O’Toole, What’s the Matter With Illinois? How an Opportunity Was Squandered to Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Procedures, CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 18; Gary L. Wells, Comments on the Mecklenburg Report
(2006), http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Illinois_Project_Wells_co
mments.pdf (last visited March 6, 2008). Some law enforcement agencies, which had
adopted the double-blind sequential reform package, also rejected the Mecklenberg
Report as methodologically flawed. See OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF WISCONSIN, ,
RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, available at
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/ILRptResponse.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
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blind versus non-blind and the simultaneous versus sequential procedures, it became impossible to tell which procedure was causing
which effect. This was particularly problematic here because it was
entirely possible that the greater number of suspect picks (and correspondingly fewer filler picks) in the non-blind simultaneous condition (the traditional method) was the result of the fact that the procedure was non-blind, not that it was simultaneous. But that would
be precisely what the laboratory studies would have predicted: in a
non-blind procedure, police are likely to influence the results or the
interpretation of the results in a way that would lead witnesses to pick
their suspects. What the Mecklenberg Report heralded as the superior results of the traditional identification procedures may have been
nothing more than confirmation that police were able to influence
witnesses to pick the person they wanted, without any guarantee that
the picks in fact were accurate.
Confronted with these competing research results and disputes
about the validity of the research, what was a court or policy maker to
do? The research scientists in this field largely condemned the Mecklenberg Report for its methodological flaws, but others challenged
the criticisms “as reflecting nothing more than the scientific com331
mentators’ stubborn loyalty to their own pre-existing beliefs.” How
could a court or legislator, untrained in science, determine which interpretation of the studies was correct?
To help resolve this dispute in an objective, scientific manner,
the Center for Modern Forensic Practice of the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice convened a blue-ribbon panel of social scientists to
examine the controversy over the Mecklenberg Report. Seven
prominent social scientists, including experts in psychology, economics, and law—none of whom had been an eyewitness identification researcher—convened to review the Mecklenberg Report. The seven
included Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman of Princeton and Har332
In 2007, they issued a report pubvard Professor Daniel Schacter.
331
Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the
Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2007).
332
The full panel included: Daniel Schacter, Professor of Psychology, Harvard
University; Robyn Dawes, Queenan Distinguished University Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, and American Statistical Association Fellow; Henry L. “Roddy” Roediger III, James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor at Washington University, and former President, Association for Psychological Science; Larry L. Jacoby,
Professor of Psychology, Washington University; Daniel Kahneman, Professor of Psychology, Princeton University, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics; Richard Lempert,
Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan School of Law, Division Director for
the Social and Economic Sciences at the National Science Foundation, 2002–2006;
Robert Rosenthal, Distinguished Professor University of California, Riverside, and
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lished in the journal Law and Human Behavior concluding that indeed
the study contains a confound—“a non-blind simultaneous procedure is compared with a blind sequential procedure”—and that “the
confound has devastating consequences for assessing the real-world
333
implications of this particular study.” The panel explained:
If it is the case that the better outcome from the nonblind/simultaneous procedure is partly or entirely attributable to
subtle, unintentional cues provided by the administrator, then the
Illinois results may simply underscore that the present procedure
produces a biased outcome that may ultimately result in the increased conviction of innocent individuals. Stated slightly differently, it is critical to determine whether the seemingly better result from the simultaneous procedure is attributable to properties
of the simultaneous procedure itself, or to the influence of the
334
non-blind administrator.

The panel also noted that the Mecklenberg Report’s results, indicating that in two of the three police jurisdictions police reported
zero filler picks in 152 lineups utilizing the non-blind simultaneous
condition, provided further reason to be concerned about the Report’s conclusions. The panel concluded that the report of zero filler
picks was suspiciously low, “justify[ing] the concern that administrator bias is operating, either consciously or unconsciously; either by
failing to count tentative ‘filler’ choices, or in steering witnesses away
335
from fillers, or toward suspects.” In sum, the panel concluded that
the Mecklenberg Report’s “design guaranteed that most outcomes
would be difficult or impossible to interpret. The only way to sort this
336
out is by conducting further studies . . . .”
Such field studies of actual identifications in real cases are currently under way, in a joint effort managed by the American Judicature Society’s Institute of Forensic Science and Public Policy, in collaboration with the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Center for
Modern Forensic Practice, the Police Foundation, the Innocence Project, and the Center for Problem Oriented Policing. The new field
studies will employ a carefully designed research protocol that will
control for all variables. By using computer-administered photo arrays, they will ensure that all potential biasing influences are elimiPierce Professor of Psychology emeritus, Harvard University, Co-Chair Task Force on
Statistical Inference, American Psychological Association. See Schacter et al., supra
note 331, at 32.
333
Id. at 4.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Id. at 4–5.
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nated and that all witness responses are accurately recorded. Thus,
the expert panel has both helped to resolve a dispute within a scientific field, and helped spur additional important research that should
prove invaluable to policy makers and criminal justice practitioners.
c.

An Example: The NRC Forensic Science Studies

On five occasions since 1979, the National Research Council
337
(NRC), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, has stepped
into controversies over a few specific forensic sciences. The NRC has
evaluated the scientific validity and appropriate uses of voice identifi338
339
340
cation evidence, polygraph evidence, DNA evidence (twice),
and most recently, comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) evi341
In each case, the NRC drew together distinguished panels
dence.
of experts from a variety of fields who studied and reported in detail
342
on the forensic science at issue.
The reports have resulted in improvements in methodology and regulation for some fields (e.g.,
DNA), greater scrutiny by courts of others (e.g., voiceprints), and
outright abandonment as unscientific of still others (e.g., CBLA).
i.

Voiceprints

The first of these studies, published in 1979, addressed voiceprint identification evidence. In 1976, at the request of the FBI, the
337
The National Academy of Sciences operates under a Congressional Charter
with the following charge: “On request of the United States Government, [the Academy] shall . . . investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art.” 36 U.S.C.A. § 150303 (West 2008). The National Research Council was
created in 1916 and serves as the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, with an express mission
of stimulating surveying, collecting, and disseminating information about scientific
matters of importance to the country. Id.; Exec. Order No. 2859 (1918), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 10668, 21 C.F.R. 3155 (1956), and Exec. Order No. 12832, 58
C.F.R. 5905 (1993).
338
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE
IDENTIFICATION (1979) [hereinafter NRC, VOICE IDENTIFICATION].
339
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003) [hereinafter NRC, THE POLYGRAPH].
340
NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 296; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996) [hereinafter NRC, EVALUATION OF
FORENSIC DNA].
341
NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199. CBLA is also sometimes referred
to as Compositional Analysis of Bullet Lead (CABL).
342
Citing these studies, Paul Giannelli has noted the appropriateness of this approach, commenting that the required research into the forensic sciences “needs to
be done outside forensic science. It should be done by independent organizations
such as the National Academy of Sciences . . . .” Giannelli, supra note 169, at
1108–09.
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NRC appointed the Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectograms
and charged it with conducting a study to determine whether the
high speed sound spectograph could identify unique voice patterns,
or “voiceprints,” matching individuals to voices captured in re343
The NRC formed a committee of eight members “reprecordings.
senting the multiplicity of disciplines involved in voice identification
344
and its uses.” After extensive study, the Committee concluded that
“[t]he practice of voice identification rests on the assumption that
intraspeaker variability is less than or different from interspeaker
variability. However, at present the assumption is not adequately sup345
In sum, the NRC concluded
ported by scientific theory and data.”
that “the underlying theory of voiceprints had not been validated and
[the] existing data did not support the proponents’ claims of high
346
In response, courts began scrutinizing such evidence
accuracy.”
347
more carefully, although they remain split on its admissibility.
ii.

DNA
348

In 1992, the NRC took up an examination of DNA.
The NRC
essentially concluded that forensic DNA analysis was good science
and should continue, but highlighted areas in which DNA labs
needed to improve their methods and procedures. The NRC recommended, among other things, that DNA laboratories establish
written laboratory protocols, develop objective and quantitative rules
for identifying the pattern of a sample, use precise and objective
matching rules, employ empirical testing to identify potential artifacts, identify the limits of each DNA typing procedure, subject each
DNA typing procedure to publication in appropriate scientific journals, and develop a solid scientific foundation and base of experience

343

See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 142–44.
NRC, VOICE IDENTIFICATION, supra note 338, at 151.
345
Id.
346
Jonakait, supra note 195, at 143.
347
See State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1235 (Ariz. 1984) (citing the NRC Report
as “particularly persuasive,” and holding that voiceprint evidence is inadmissible);
State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781, 783–89 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing the NRC Report,
among other research, and holding that voiceprint evidence is inadmissible); People
v. Hubbard, 738 N.W.2d 769, 769–70 (Mich. 2007) (Markman, J., concurring) (concurring in order denying petition for leave to appeal and urging the court to revisit
the issue of admissibility of voiceprint evidence, and noting that, since the Michigan
Supreme Court last addressed the issue in 1977, “five states have admitted such evidence, [see, e.g., People v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999)], and six states have rejected such evidence, [see, e.g., State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224 (Ariz. 1984)].”).
348
See NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 298.
344
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before employing any new DNA typing procedures.
The NRC also
made specific recommendations for compiling appropriate databases
and utilizing appropriate statistical procedures for assessing the sig350
Further the NRC recommended accreditanificance of a match.
tion and proficiency testing, establishment of quality-assurance programs, and creation of a National Committee on Forensic DNA
Typing “to provide expert advice primarily on scientific and technical
351
issues concerning forensic DNA typing.” The immediate result was
to produce legal challenges to the admissibility of DNA (some suc352
cessful), and ultimately, an improvement in DNA laboratory prac353
tices.
In 1996, the NRC revisited DNA because, at that time, the “winds
354
of controversy” surrounding DNA profiling had “not been stilled.”
The second DNA report noted that the first report had “resolved a
number of questions, and several of its recommendations were widely
355
In the second report, the NRC made recommendations
adopted.”
about how to minimize errors in the laboratory and in chain of custody, proposed calculating procedures that take into account the
question of population subdivision, and addressed statistical problems with the interpretation of DNA evidence, including the use of
356
databases. The Report was not without its critics, but since then
DNA practice has gradually improved and current dominant DNA
profiling techniques have achieved virtually unquestioned admissibil357
ity status.

349

Id. at 72.
Id. at 94–95.
351
Id. at 73, 108–09.
352
Following the first NRC DNA report, FBI Director William Sessions requested
the second NRC study, noting in part that “11 of 30 appellate decisions on the admissibility of DNA evidence had ruled it inadmissible and ‘courts in Canada, Australia,
and the United Kingdom began hearing challenges to DNA evidence—citing the
NRC report—immediately following its release.’” William C. Thompson, Accepting
Lower Standards: The National Research Council’s Second Report on Forensic DNA Evidence,
37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 407 n.7 (1997) (quoting Letter from William Sessions, Director, FBI, to Dr. Frank Press, President, National Academy of Sciences, Apr. 16, 1993).
353
Berger, supra note 12, at 1127.
354
NRC, EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA, supra note 340, at v.
355
Id.
356
E.g., Thompson, supra note 352, at 410 (arguing that the second DNA report
backpedaled on some of the recommendations from the first report).
357
Berger, supra note 12, at 1128.
350
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iii. The Polygraph
In 2003, the NRC examined the scientific validity of the polygraph. This analysis was undertaken at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, primarily to examine the validity of using poly358
graphs as an employment and security screening tool.
Thus, while
the NRC also considered the use of the polygraph in criminal investigations, its primary focus was on its use in non-incident-related
screening tests of prospective government employees. The NRC concluded that “specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying
from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below per359
fection.” But the NRC said that the polygraph was probably less accurate when used as a non-incident-related screening tool, and that
“[i]ts accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators
from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in
360
employee security screening in federal agencies.”
iv. Bullet Lead
The NRC’s most recent study of a forensic science provides a
particularly revealing demonstration of the importance of enhancing
the adversary process with neutral oversight of the forensic sciences
by scientific experts. For over forty years, the FBI analyzed and testified about the composition of bullet lead as a means of matching
crime scene bullet fragments to bullets found in the possession of a
361
suspect.
The technique, first used in the investigation into Presi362
dent Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, was employed in cases in
which bullet fragments collected from a crime scene were too small
363
or damaged to permit standard ballistics analysis.
In such cases,
FBI analysts would analyze the bullet lead from crime scene fragments and from bullets found in a suspect’s possession for seven trace
elements—arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and cad-

358

NRC, THE POLYGRAPH, supra note 339, at xiii.
Id. at 4.
360
Id. at 6.
361
D.H. Kaye, The Current State of Bullet-Lead Evidence, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 99, 99
(2006).
362
John Solomon, Silent Injustice: Bullet-matching Science Debunked, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 2007, at A1.
363
D.H. Kaye, The NRC Bullet-Lead Report: Should Science Committees Make Legal Findings?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 92 (2005). Ballistics examinations usually involve matching the striations on a bullet caused by its passage through the barrel of a gun with
marks on bullets fired from a suspect’s gun. NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note
199, at 1.
359
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364

mium.
If the two bullets were determined “statistically to be analytically indistinguishable for each of the elemental concentration
means,” the analyst would conclude that they probably came from the
365
The precise testimony about such matches varied
same “source.”
from one analyst to the next, with some experts testifying that the two
366
bullets were “analytically indistinguishable” or “could have” come
367
from the same “batch” of lead. Other experts went further and tes368
tified that the two bullets came from the same “source,” or from a
369
box manufactured the same day, or that the two bullets were made
370
by the same manufacturer on the same day and at the same hour,
371
or even that they came from “the same box of ammunition.”
Although the technique has been used in approximately 2500
372
373
cases, until recently it was almost never challenged in court.
Indeed, there were no serious challenges to the technique until a retired FBI examiner, William Tobin, began writing articles questioning
374
the technique —again, demonstrating both that the defense bar on
its own was not up to the task and that one reason no experts challenged the technique was that the only experts were those engaged in
375
Although the technique
or recently retired from the field itself.
had been used in criminal cases for decades, until recently there was
virtually no research literature on the matter (particularly on the
376
bases for statistical analyses employed), and courts routinely admit-

364

Id. at 2.
Id.
366
E.g., Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
367
State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012–13 (Or. 1974) (en banc).
368
United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v. Lane,
628 N.E.2d 682, 689–90 (Ill. App Ct. 1993).
369
State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson, 499
N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986); Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (en banc), vacated, 509 U.S. 917 (1993).
370
Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979).
371
Commonwealth v. Daye, No. 11238-11246, 2005 WL 1971027, at *1 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 3, 2005); see Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981); State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
372
Kaye, supra note 363, at 99 n.1.
373
Id. at 102.
374
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead
Analasys (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43, 45
(2003).
375
See State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 339–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting affidavits establishing that, until recently, there were no experts outside the FBI
capable of testifying about CBLA).
376
Giannelli, supra note 203, at 200.
365
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377

ted it without much question. During the thirty-plus years in which
CBLA was used, there were fewer than two dozen published appellate
opinions on the technique, and all but one of the courts that ad378
dressed CBLA admitted it. Indeed, in one of the few cases in which
a defendant sought to fight the CBLA evidence, the defendant did
not move to exclude the FBI testimony as unreliable, but instead
sought to introduce his own expert challenging the FBI expert’s con379
The court, however, excluded the defense expert on the
clusions.
basis that the defense expert was offered only to testify about the
380
manufacturing process, and he was not an expert in that. The jury
heard the state’s CBLA evidence without rebuttal.
Finally, in response to the criticisms leveled by Tobin and his coauthors, the FBI asked the NRC to study the technique. The NRC
appointed a committee of fourteen experts in science, engineering,
381
mathematics, statistics, criminalistics, and law to conduct the study.
In a 2004 report, the NRC concluded that the instrumentation and
method for measuring trace elemental concentration—the modern
technique is known as inductively coupled plasma-optical emission
382
383
spectroscopy, or ICP-OES —is valid and reliable, but that the
available data do not support testimony that two bullets originated
from the same box of ammunition or from the same manufacturer,
384
The FBI initially reor were manufactured on the same date.
sponded defensively, reaffirming its view that the testimony of its ana385
lysts was valid and scientifically sound.
But armed with Tobin’s
377

Kaye, supra note 361, at 102 (collecting cases).
Mark Hansen, Bullet Proof, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 61.
379
State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994).
380
Id.
381
NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199, app. at B.
382
Previously, analysts had used a technique known as neutron activation analysis
(NAA). Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 374, at 44.
383
NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199, at 23.
384
Id. at 107.
385
Indeed, John Solomon, an investigative journalist with the Washington Post who
did an in-depth investigation into the FBI’s handling of CBLA evidence, reports:
As early as 1991, the FBI lab had done a study that raised questions
about some of the assumptions being made about lead bullet matches.
But rather than seeing the red flags, the scientists dismissed them as coincidences. In 2002 when one of the FBI’s own retired metallurgist[s]
questioned the science, the FBI sought to drown out his concerns by
flooding the forensic science journals with articles praising the bullet
lead science. And even after the National Academy of Sciences concluded the science was flawed in both its statistics and testimony, many
in the lab fought to continue its use or at least to minimize the problems when informing the public.
Solomon, supra note 362.
378
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criticisms and the new NRC Report, defense lawyers and courts began
386
to question the technique. Beginning around the time of the NRC
Report, courts began excluding CBLA testimony. Reflecting the impact of the NRC Report, for example, in Ragland v. Commonwealth,
the Kentucky Supreme Court issued an opinion in 2004 just prior to
publication of the report that rejected an attack on bullet-lead testi387
mony.
Two years later, after publication of the NRC Report, the
Kentucky Supreme Court reheard the case. Quoting extensively from
the Report, the court this time concluded that the bullet lead evi388
Other courts have followed
dence was inadmissible under Daubert.
389
suit.
In 2005, a year after the NRC Report, the FBI abandoned CBLA
390
altogether.
The FBI reported, in a letter to the executive director
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in late
summer 2005, that the FBI was discontinuing its use of CBLA “based
primarily on the inability of scientists or manufacturers to definitively
evaluate the significance of an association between bullets made in
391
the course of a bullet lead examination.”
Yet in that same letter,
the FBI continued to insist that “the FBI Laboratory still firmly supports the scientific foundation of bullet lead analysis,” and that it was
dropping the analysis only because of “the costs of maintaining the
equipment, the resources necessary to do the examination, and its
392
But by 2007, the FBI conceded that any
relative probative value.”
testimony suggesting that CBLA could identify a bullet as coming
393
from any particular box of bullets was insupportable, and announced that it would review all bullet lead cases in which its agents
testified and alert prosecutors to any misleading statements so that

386
An article noting the scientific challenges to CBLA, for example, appeared in
the ABA Journal in 2004. Hansen, supra note 378, at 60.
387
Ragland v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0388-MR, 2004 WL 2623926 (Ky. Nov.
18, 2004).
388
Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006). For a discussion
of the case, see Kaye, supra note 361, at 103–05.
389
See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868
A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (granting a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence about scientific challenges to CBLA).
390
Solomon, supra note 362, at A1.
391
Letter from Dwight E. Adams, Director, FBI Laboratory, to Ralph Grunewald,
Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Sept. 1, 2005)
(on file with author).
392
Id.
393
Solomon, supra note 362, at A1.
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394

the defendants can be notified.
Currently, the FBI is working cooperatively with a task force of defense lawyers assembled by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Innocence
Project to identify cases in which individuals might have been wrongly
395
The adversary system now has
convicted based on CBLA evidence.
a chance to respond appropriately to this flawed science, but it could
not do so without the organized expertise of the NRC.
2.

Toward Institutionalized Oversight of Forensic Sciences

As the examples in the last section show, forensic science committees can and should evaluate forensic scientific evidence and
techniques. Such oversight is particularly important in the forensic
sciences used in the criminal justice system where, historically, there
has been a dearth of rigorous, peer-reviewed testing. Fortunately,
there are indications that Congress might be moving in that direction, at least tentatively.
In November 2005, Congress took a step toward institutionalizing the scientific review of forensic sciences when the House of Representatives joined with the Senate in allocating $1,500,000 to the National Academy of Sciences to create an independent Committee on
396
The
Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community.
House and Senate Reports directed that the Committee, which was to
include “members of the forensics community representing operational crime laboratories, medical examiners, and coroners; legal experts; and other scientists as determined appropriate,” was to, among
other things, broadly examine the needs of the forensic science
community, identify potential scientific advances, make recommendations for making more and better use of the forensic sciences, and
“disseminate best practices and guidelines concerning the collection
and analysis of forensic evidence to help ensure quality and consistency in the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve
397
The Commitcrimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public.”
tee, co-chaired by Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Constantine Gatsonis, Director of the
Center for Statistical Sciences at Brown University, has been actively
394

John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2007, at

A2.
395
John Solomon, Lawyer Groups to Flag Cases Needing Review, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
2007, at A9.
396
H.R. REP. No. 109-272, at 121 (2005); S. REP. 109-88, at 46 (2005).
397
S. REP. 109-88, at 46 (2005); see The National Academies, Project Information:
Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, http://www8.nationalaca
demies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=48741 (last visited March 6, 2008).
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engaged in reviewing a broad range of forensic science practices, undertaking the kind of searching inquiry that has largely been beyond
the capability of most criminal case litigants. Its report and recommendations are due sometime in the summer of 2008. Although it is
not yet clear what the Committee will recommend, there is at least
some apparent interest in establishing permanent mechanisms for
providing oversight to the forensic sciences.
V. CONCLUSION
While our system professes to value truth, and in particular that
version of truth that is most likely to protect the innocent, disparities
in the adversary criminal justice system threaten that hierarchy of
values. At multiple points in the adversary process, criminal defendants are at a distinct disadvantage, and thus the risk of error falls
heavily and uncomfortably on the shoulders of criminal defendants,
even innocent criminal defendants. The way our system handles forensic science evidence is a particularly powerful example of that imbalance.
One way to correct this imbalance might be to change the rules
and processes that disadvantage defendants and to increase dramatically the resources available for indigent defense legal services. While
such reforms might be advisable, and some even achievable, the political will is likely not there to make wholesale reforms, especially reforms requiring the commitment of resources for defense attorneys,
which would be necessary to allow the adversary system to function
properly.
Instead, some signs are beginning to emerge in a variety of contexts suggesting that the weakness of adversarial adjudication can be
398
replaced effectively by more reliance on administrative processes.
One example of this shift is the movement to provide better oversight
of and information about forensic sciences rather than leaving it to
the parties and case-by-case litigation to address the reliability of forensic science evidence. The system needs a permanent forensic science commission or institute, which could be charged with the responsibility to independently evaluate and validate the sciences,
establish recommendations for admissibility, recommend or establish
protocols, recommend cautionary instructions, create incentives for
research and validation, provide funding for such research, and oversee accreditation and blind proficiency testing.

398

See Brown, supra note 24, at 1591.
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Ironically, by shifting some of the responsibility for ensuring the
accuracy of forensic science evidence away from the adversary process
and toward an administrative process more dependent on scientists,
the system will provide the tools that will better permit the adversary
process to work in criminal cases.

